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There has been an increasing interest in the topic of forgiveness in the recent years. 
However, till now, the bulk of research has looked at forgiveness from the victims’ perspective. 
Hence, in my dissertation, I seek to contribute to the literature by looking at forgiveness from the 
perspective of the offenders – that is, the notion of Being-Forgiven or Forgiven-ness.  
As we know, forgiveness is relevant against a backdrop of transgressions and errors 
(transgressions and errors will be referred to as ‘mistakes’ for the sake of brevity). In general, 
when people commit mistakes, negative outcomes usually follow. In my dissertation, I examine 
if the offenders’ experience of being-forgiven for their mistakes may lead to a reduction in their 
negative emotions; furthermore, I examine if offenders’ experience of being-forgiven may also 
lead them to experience positive outcomes – outcomes with a human flourishing flavor. 
Specifically, I examine three types of human flourishing outcomes – the emotional aspects of 
gratitude and happiness, the behavioral/social aspect of prosocial behavior, and the cognitive 
aspect of creativity. Furthermore, I examine if offenders’ emotion states may be a mediating 
mechanism that underlies the relationship between their experience of forgiveness and their 
prosocial behavior and creativity. My proposed framework is tested on two types of mistakes – 
work errors and interpersonal transgressions. An experiment and a survey are conducted to test 
my hypotheses and proposed framework.  
Results of my empirical studies converge to show that perceived mistake severity and the 
extent to which offenders have been forgiven for their mistakes have no effect on their creativity. 
That is, my experiment and survey show that offenders’ experience of being-forgiven does not 
lead them toward cognitive-based human flourishing outcomes.  
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Within the context of work errors, my experiment shows that offenders’ experience of 
being-forgiven removes the effect of perceived mistake severity on fear; however, it does not 
lead to any social- and emotion-based human flourishing outcomes.  
Within the context of interpersonal transgressions, my survey shows that the extent to 
which offenders have been forgiven for their transgressions is positively related to their feelings 
of gratitude and happiness; furthermore, when offenders have been forgiven for severe 
transgressions (as compared to that of slight transgressions), they feel even more gratitude and 
happiness. This pattern of findings resonates with an emotion-based human flourishing story. In 
addition, my survey shows that offenders’ experience of being-forgiven for their transgression 
leads them to feel guilt and shame at levels that are commensurate with the amount of harm that 
they had inflicted on their victims, thus yielding within them a sensitive emotional moral 
barometer – which may be a form of optimal human functioning. Through its effect on offenders 
emotions (gratitude, happiness, shame, and guilt), the joint effects of offenders’ perception of 
transgression severity and of the extent to which they have been forgiven indirectly influence 
their prosocial behavior – a behavioral or social form of human flourishing.   
 In sum, my dissertation shows that offenders’ experience of being-forgiven for work 
errors does not lead them to experience any human flourishing outcomes; by contrast, offenders’ 
experience of being-forgiven for interpersonal transgressions leads them to experience emotion-
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‘Blessed is he whose transgression is forgiven, whose sin is covered’ (Psalm 32:1, New King 
James Version Bible) 
In 1943 at a concentration camp, a Nazi soldier summoned a Jew to his bedside. On his 
deathbed, the Nazi soldier asked the Jew for forgiveness; he asked the Jew to forgive him for the 
transgressions that he had committed against other Jews during the World War II. This Jew – 
Wiesenthal – later wrote a book, entitled ‘The sunflower: On the possibilities and limits of 
forgiveness’. Using this scenario – this personal encounter – as a prelude to a symposium, 
Wiesenthal poses the question ‘what would you have done if you were in my shoes; would you, 
as a victim, have offered forgiveness to the Nazi soldier’? And yet, this scenario, which served as 
a provocative prelude to the discourse on forgiveness among numerous eminent people, 
illustrates the importance of forgiveness not only from the victim’s perspective, but also from the 
offender’s perspective. Indeed, what else can be as important as a person’s dying request? 
Although originating from the fields of theology and philosophy (Murphy, 2003; North, 
1987; Rye et al., 2000), forgiveness research has gained increasing popularity in the fields of 
psychology and organizational behavior (e.g., Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2006; Bradfield & Aquino, 
1999; Crossley, 2009; Enright, 2001; Fehr, Gelfand, & Nag, 2010; McCullough, Worthington, & 
Rachal, 1997). However, till now, the bulk of forgiveness research examines forgiveness from 
the victims’ (i.e., the forgivers’) perspective; precious little research has examined forgiveness 
from the perspective of the offenders. Yet, as highlighted in the preceding story, the offenders’ 
experience of being forgiven for their mistakes, errors, and transgressions is also important. 
Moreover, if we are to truly understand the whole phenomenon of forgiveness, we need to 
examine forgiveness not only from the victims’ perspective, but also from the offenders’ 
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perspective. Indeed, the whole meaning and experience of forgiveness cannot be studied apart 
from the offenders’ input about being forgiven as this will have implications on the dyadic 
interpersonal interactions between the offenders and victims (Kelley, 1998; Strelan & Covic, 
2006). Thus, a holistic view of forgiveness necessitates more forgiveness studies to be conducted 
from the perspective of the offenders.  
Hence, my dissertation seeks to fill this crucial gap and contributes to the literature by 
examining forgiveness from the offenders’ perspective – that is, the notion of Being-Forgiven or 
Forgiven-ness. Stated precisely, Forgiven-ness refers to ‘offenders’ perception of the extent to 
which they have been forgiven by their victims for their mistakes, errors, or transgressions’.  
To elaborate, forgiveness is relevant against a backdrop of mistakes, errors or 
transgressions. Examples of transgressions include trust violation, unfairness, abuse, incivility, 
mistreatment, counter-productive work behaviors (Chan, 2009; Chan & Arvey, 2011; Chan & 
McAllister, 2014; Greenberg, 2006; Hall & Fincham, 2008; Hershcovis & Barling, 2010; Klass, 
1978; Lewicki, 1983; Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Lim & Cortina, 2005; Robinson & Bennett, 
1995; Tepper, 2007). Examples of errors include work errors, improper implementation of 
protocols, among others (Berlinger, 2005; van Dyck et al. 2005; Zhao & Olivera, 2006). In 
general, mistakes, errors and transgressions occur when individuals have ‘fallen short’ of a 
standard or obligation (Berlinger, 2005). In my dissertation, the generic term ‘mistake’ is 
employed to refer to error and transgression for the sake of brevity. 
Within the context of mistakes – whether they are transgressions or errors – individuals 
who have committed mistakes will typically experience bad outcomes – for example, these 
offenders may experience guilt and fear; they may ruminate about their mistakes, which may in 
turn lead to lowered work performance and detrimental psychological well-being. In my 
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dissertation, I investigate if offenders’ experience of being forgiven for their mistakes may lead 
to a reduction in some of these negative outcomes. Of greater importance, I further explore the 
question of whether offenders’ experience of being forgiven for mistakes may also lead them to 
experience positive outcomes – in particular, human flourishing or optimal human functioning 
outcomes. If the answer to this question is ‘yes’, then it shows that mistakes can paradoxically 
lead to human flourishing – if offenders have been forgiven for the mistakes. Indeed, this reflects 
the transformative power of forgiveness for the offenders. Furthermore, I examine if an emotion-
based mechanism underlies the relationship between offenders’ experience of forgiveness and 
some of their human flourishing/optimal human functioning outcomes. Figures 1 and 2 depict the 
frameworks for my dissertation. 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
Following, I provide an overview of my dissertation: first, I explicate the definition and 
nature of the Forgiven-ness construct. Second, I review the existing literature on the 
consequences of offenders’ experience of being-forgiven – the focus of my dissertation. Third, I 
elaborate on the theoretical underpinnings for my hypotheses and frameworks. Fourth, I give an 
account of my empirical studies before ending with a general discussion of my dissertation.  
LITERATURE REVIEW: DEFINITION AND NATURE OF FORGIVENESS 
Prelude: Forgiveness from the Victims’ Perspective 
Various definitions of forgiveness have been proposed by prominent scholars – 
McCullough, North, Enright, Finkel – to name a few. Since most of the research on forgiveness 
within the organizational behavior and psychology fields have been conducted from the victims’ 
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perspective, existing definitions of forgiveness have mostly adopted the victims’ standpoint. 
Hence, as a prelude, I provide a brief overview of the forgiveness construct from the victims’ 
standpoint, before elaborating on the forgiveness construct from the offenders’ standpoint – that 
is, the Being-Forgiven or Forgiven-ness notion, which is the focus of my dissertation.  
At a specific level, McCullough et al. (1997) refers to forgiveness as a transformation in a 
victims’ motivation, such that there is a reduction in revenge motivation, reduction in avoidance 
motivation, and an increase in the motivation to have benevolence or goodwill toward their 
offenders. At a broader level, Enright and the Human Development Study Group (1996) define 
forgiving as “a willingness to abandon one’s right to resentment, condemnation, and subtle 
revenge toward an offender who acts unjustly, while fostering the undeserved qualities of 
compassion, generosity, and even love toward him or her” (pp. 108). In this definition, 
forgiveness involves a transformation of the victims’ feelings, thoughts, and behavior toward 
their offenders from being negatively- to being positively-valenced – that is, a transformation 
from having a negative attitude to having a positive attitude toward their offenders. Also at a 
broad level, researchers define forgiveness as the cancellation of interpersonal debt that has 
arisen from transgressions (Finkel, Rusbult, Kumashiro, & Hannon, 2002; Stanley, 1991; 
Wallace, Exline, & Baumeister, 2008).  
Researchers have also demarcated the scope of the forgiveness construct by noting what 
forgiveness is not. First, forgiveness is not condoning (Enright, 2001; Exline, Worthington, Hill, 
& McCullough, 2003; Worthington, 2009) since the notion of forgiveness is relevant only when 
people recognize that a wrong has been committed. Second, forgiveness is not forgetting 
(Enright, 2001; Exline et al., 2003). That is, forgiveness does not require the victims to forget 
about the mistakes; rather, it merely requires that the victims do not continue to regard their 
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offenders only in light of the mistakes (Enright and the Human Development Group, 1996) – for 
example, the victims see more human value and worth in their offenders than the mistakes that 
they had committed (Murphy & Hampton, 1988; Smedes, 1996). Third, forgiveness does not 
imply reconciliation, although it can facilitate reconciliation (Enright, 2001; Exline et al., 2003; 
Worthington, 2009). Fourth, forgiveness does not preclude punishment; the only caveat is that 
the punishment must not be motivated by a vengeance goal as this implies that the victims have 
not forgiven their offenders yet (Murphy, 2003). That is, the offenders may be forgiven by the 
victims and yet still receive punishment – this punishment may be in line with the goal of legal 
justice, goal of rehabilitation, or any goal other than to quench the victims’ thirst for vengeance 
(Murphy, 2003). 
 
Forgiveness from the Offenders’ Perspective: Being-Forgiven or Forgiven-ness 
Forgiveness, as defined in the preceding section, pertains to the victims’ standpoint. What 
about forgiveness from the standpoint of the offenders – the focus of my dissertation? From the 
offenders’ perspective, forgiveness is relevant when they have committed a mistake (i.e., which 
includes error and transgression in my dissertation), whether the mistake was intended or not 
(Enright, 2001; Smedes, 1996). According to Enright and the Human Development Group 
(1996), offenders experience and perceive forgiveness when they deem that their victims have 
ceased negative feelings, thoughts and behaviors toward them, and have replaced these with 
positive feelings, thoughts and behaviors toward the offenders. However, Enright and the Human 
Development Group clarify that not all six aspects need to be met in order for offenders to be 
considered forgiven; the offenders may receive varying degrees of forgiveness. Offenders also 
perceive that they have been forgiven by their victims when they deem that their victims have 
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cancelled the interpersonal debt (arising from the mistakes) against them or has ‘let go of the 
mistake’ – this is in line with other researchers’ broader definition of victim forgiveness-giving 
(e.g., Finkel et al., 2002; Stanley, 1991).  
In my dissertation, the definition of Being-Forgiven or Forgiven-ness incorporates 
Enright and colleagues’ (1996) definition as well as the notion of ‘interpersonal debt 
cancellation’ (e.g., Finkel et al., 2002). To reiterate, Forgiven-ness refers to ‘offenders’ 
perception of the extent to which they have been forgiven by their victims for their mistakes, 
errors, or transgressions’ in my dissertation.  
Next, I would like to highlight four characteristics of the Forgiven-ness construct. First, 
as noted in the preceding paragraph, offenders’ perception of being forgiven for their mistakes 
exist on a continuum (Enright and the Human Development Group, 1996) – that is, Forgivenness 
can be conceived of as a continuous variable, rather than as a binary forgiven-versus-unforgiven 
variable. Second, as a perceptual construct, Forgiven-ness is a unitary, global construct that taps 
offenders’ perception of their victims’ forgiveness (or the lack of it). Third, the Forgiven-ness 
construct pertains only to the offenders perceiving and receiving forgiveness from their victims – 
the scope of my Forgiven-ness construct does not extend to the offenders seeking forgiveness 
from their victims. Indeed, Ashby (2003) noted that “Those who are “seeking forgiveness” do 
not yet have a sense that they have been forgiven. They are seeking forgiveness that has not yet 
been offered” (pp. 144). 
Lastly, the offenders’ Forgiven-ness experience is studied as a state construct in my 
dissertation. The reason for this pertains to the malleability of the victims’ forgiveness. 
Specifically, researchers have noted that victims’ forgiveness may be malleable – for example, 
victims may sometimes have transient experiences of forgiveness (temporary forgiveness; 
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McCullough, Fincham, & Tsang, 2003); victims may sometimes decide to forgive their offenders 
and yet experience recurring negative emotions (e.g., anger) (Karremans & van Lange, 2010; 
Merolla, 2008; Smedes, 1996; Zechmeister & Romero, 2002). This has led some researchers to 
describe forgiveness as not being under the victims’ complete control (Karremans & van Lange, 
2010). The malleability of victims’ forgiveness will have corresponding implications on the 
offenders’ Forgiven-ness experience and perception, as the victims’ forgiveness (or the lack of it) 
will be implicitly or explicitly communicated to their offenders through their social interactions. 
Therefore, the offenders’ Forgiven-ness experience and perception may change – corresponding 
to the changes in the victims’ expressions of forgiveness. In other words, the offenders’ 
Forgivenness experience may not necessarily be permanent – it may change as the offenders 
interact with their victims. Thus, the malleability of victims’ forgiveness suggests that it will be 
expedient to regard offenders’ Forgiven-ness perception as a state construct. The Forgiven-ness 
construct is therefore studied as a state construct in my dissertation.   
 
Consequences of Being-Forgiven 
In general, existing research has investigated the emotional and behavioral consequences 
of offenders’ being-forgiven experience. First, research shows that offenders’ experience of 
being forgiven for their mistakes may give rise to emotional consequences. For example, 
research shows that the experience of being forgiven for their mistakes may lead offenders to 
feel happiness and relief (Gassin, 1998). Using an imagery methodology, Witvliet and colleagues 
(Witvliet, Ludwig, & Bauer, 2002) asked their subjects to imagine seeking forgiveness from 
someone that they had actually hurt previously, and then imagine their victims’ responses to 
them. This study shows that subjects who imagined that their victims forgave them experienced 
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less shame, less guilt, less fear, and more gratitude (as compared to those who imagined that 
their victims did not forgive them).  
Second, research shows that offenders’ experience of being forgiven for their mistakes 
may also give rise to behavioral outcomes. One of the most important behavioral outcomes that 
forgiveness researchers are concerned with is offender repentance versus reoffending/recidivism. 
The empirical evidence shows the following: first, research shows that when subjects have been 
forgiven for their mistakes, they are less likely to offend again, they have greater repentance, and 
they desire not to hurt their victims again (Gassin, 1998; Struthers, Eaton, Shirvani, Georghiou, 
& Edell, 2008; Wallace et al., 2008). However, McNulty’s (2010) study shows contradictory 
findings. Specifically, McNulty’s study shows that as compared to times when individuals are 
not forgiven for negative behaviors, the times when they are forgiven for negative behaviors led 
to more negative behaviors subsequently. These inconsistent findings caution us against making 
strong conclusions about the effect of forgiveness on offenders’ subsequent behaviors.   
 In addition, research shows that when offenders perceive that their victims have forgiven 
them, the offenders’ self-forgiveness increases (Hall & Fincham, 2008). Research also suggests 
that after receiving forgiveness for their mistakes, offenders may feel free to offer forgiveness to 
others who have transgressed against them (Gassin, 1998; Smedes, 1996; Worthington, 2009).  
Will being forgiven for mistakes lead to human flourishing? 
In my dissertation, I seek to extend the research on the consequences of offenders’ 
experience of being forgiven for their mistakes. Specifically, I pose the question: when offenders 
have been forgiven for their mistakes, more than a reduction in negative outcomes (e.g., 
reduction in negative affect and psychopathology), is it also possible that this being-forgiven 
experience will lead to positive outcomes for the offenders? In my dissertation, I examine if and 
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how offenders’ experience of being forgiven for their mistakes may also lead them toward 
human flourishing/optimal human functioning outcomes. Specifically, I examine prosocial 
behavior, creativity, gratitude and happiness as (respectively) behavioral/social, cognitive, and 
emotional aspects of human flourishing in my dissertation. To elaborate, prosocial behavior 
refers to actions which are performed to benefit another person (Eisenberg, 1991), and is a social 
approach behavior (von Dawans, Fischbacher, Kirschbaum, Fehr, & Heinrichs, 2012).  
Creativity involves the generation of novel ideas/products that are valuable and useful 
(Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; Mumford & Gustafson, 1988; Sternberg & Lubart, 1999). 
Creativity is needed for problem-solving and is an aspect of optimal human functioning 
(Simonton, 2000). In general, some cognitive processes that are involved in creativity are 
divergent thinking process, associative process (e.g., forming connections among various ideas), 
and transformative process (e.g., processes of restructuring information, redefining categories) 
(Baas, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008; Guilford, 1962). 
A popular measure of creativity is the divergent thinking test (Plucker & Renzulli, 1999). 
In general, the divergent thinking test requires subjects to generate multiple ideas within a set 
duration of time (Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; Mumford & Gustafson, 1988). An example of a 
widely used divergent thinking test is the Alternate Uses Test (Simonton, 2005; Sternberg & 
Lubart, 1999), which requires subjects to think of as many uses for an object (e.g., a brick, paper 
clip) as possible. Divergent thinking tests are then scored for fluency, flexibility, and originality 
(Sternberg & Lubart, 1999). Specifically, fluency refers to the number of non-redundant ideas 
that subjects generate; flexibility indicates the number of different response categories that 
subjects’ ideas span (which reflects the diversity of ideas); and originality pertains to the 
unusualness of ideas that are generated (Baas et al., 2008; Runco, 2004). 
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The emotional aspects of human flourishing are addressed in the next section. 
Furthermore, I examine if offenders’ state emotions may be a mediating mechanism that 
underlies the relationship between their experience of forgiveness and their human flourishing 
outcomes of creativity and prosocial behavior. Before doing so, I will provide an overview of the 
emotions literature.  
 
Emotions 
Emotions are triggered by events (Frijda, 1986; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). However, 
not all events can elicit emotions; only events that are personally significant and meaningful can 
trigger people’s emotions (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991). To elaborate, events that have personal 
significance for people are first appraised in terms of their positivity versus negativity for them – 
specifically, emotions are appraised according to benefit versus harm, good versus bad, favorable 
versus unfavorable to the attainment of people’s goals, pleasant versus unpleasant (Frijda, 
Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Lazarus, 1991; Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O’Connor, 1987). In 
general, events that are appraised positively (e.g., beneficial events, favorable/pleasurable 
events) will activate positive emotions, while events that are appraised negatively will activate 
negative emotions.  
At a more subordinate/elaborate level in the emotion hierarchy (Shaver et al., 1987), 
different appraisal patterns lead to different discrete emotions (Lazarus, 1991). For example, 
people’s appraisal of threat leads to the emotion of fear (Frijda, 1986; Shaver et al., 1987), 
people’s appraisal that they have failed to meet their standards and obligations leads to the self-
evaluative emotions of guilt and shame (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney, Stuewig, & 
Mashek, 2007; Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994); people’s appraisal that they have 
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received a benefit from others may activate the gratitude emotion (McCullough, Kilpatrick, 
Emmons, & Larson, 2001). 
Researchers further posit that emotions can be distinguished from one another not only 
according to their appraisal patterns, but also according to their action tendencies/readiness 
(Frijda, 1986; Frijda et al., 1989, Lazarus, 1991; Shaver et al., 1987). For example, the action 
tendency of fear is flight/avoidance and self-protection; fear is also associated with 
freezing/immobilization and behavioral inhibition (Frijda, 1986; Gray, 1990; Izard & Ackerman, 
2000; Kish-Gephart, Detert, Trevino, & Edmonson, 2009; Lazarus, 1991). In shame, people feel 
like hiding, “disappearing from view”; shame may thus be associated with an 
avoidance/withdrawal tendency (Frijda et al., 1989; Kim, Thibodeau, & Jorgensen, 2011; Sheikh 
& Janoff-Bulman, 2010; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994; Tangney et al., 2007). In guilt, 
people are motivated to make reparations for their bad action or inaction – as such, guilt may be 
construed to have an approach tendency (Baumeister et al., 1994; Kim et al., 2011; Sheikh & 
Janoff-Bulman, 2010; Tangney, 1991; Tangney et al., 2007). When people experience gratitude, 
they are more likely to behave prosocially toward their benefactor and other third parties 
(McCullough et al., 2001). The experience of joy is associated with an approach tendency, as 
well as cognitive and social expansiveness (Fredrickson, 2001; Frijda et al., 1989; Lazarus, 1991; 
Shaver et al., 1987). As can be seen, emotions, in general, activate either the approach or 
avoidance tendencies. Indeed, researchers observe that positive emotions are generally 
associated with the approach tendency, while negative emotions are generally associated with the 
avoidance tendency (Carver & White, 1994). Of course, there are exceptions to this – for 
example, the negative emotion of guilt is associated with an approach tendency. In my 
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dissertation, the experience of committing mistakes and the experience of being forgiven for 
their mistakes are events that will trigger offenders’ emotions.  
 
The Mistake- and Being-Forgiven-Events and the Emotion-based Mechanism 
Effect of Mistake- and Being-Forgiven-events on negative emotions 
Committing mistakes is an event that will trigger offenders’ negative emotions (Zhao, 
2011). In general, research shows that committing mistakes – be it work errors or transgressions 
– may lead offenders to experience fear, shame, and guilt (Berlinger, 2005; Delbanco & Bell, 
2007; Hall & Fincham, 2005; Zhao & Olivera, 2006). Specifically, having committed a mistake 
(e.g., interpersonal transgression), offenders may anticipate that their victims will try to get even 
with them or anticipate some form of punishment – this threat appraisal will activate their fear 
emotion (Frijda, 1986). Also, committing mistakes, whether through action or inaction, 
essentially implies that the offenders and their behaviors have ‘fallen short’ of their standard or 
obligations (Berlinger, 2005), which will in turn elicit their self-conscious moral emotions of 
shame and guilt (Berlinger, 2005; Hall & Fincham, 2005; McGraw, 1987; Tangney et al., 2007).  
To clarify, although shame and guilt may be triggered by the same event, they are distinct 
emotions (Lewis, 1971). Essentially, while shame involves a negative evaluation of the self (i.e., 
that the self is unworthy), guilt involves a negative evaluation of the behavior (Tangney & 
Dearing, 2002). That is, the object of evaluation is the self when shame is experienced; the object 
of evaluation is the behavior when guilt is experienced (Lewis, 1971; Tangney, 1991). In 
general, the greater the offenders’ perception of mistake severity, the greater will be their 





Having committed mistakes, offenders may anticipate that retaliation or punishment may 
befall them (e.g., their victims may get even with them) – this threat appraisal will then elicit the 
emotion of fear within the offenders (Frijda, 1986). Furthermore, the greater the offenders’ 
mistakes (e.g., the more severely that the offenders have transgressed against or hurt their 
victims), the more retaliation/punishment the offenders would anticipate, and thus the greater the 
offenders’ fear will be. Therefore, offenders’ perception of mistake severity (i.e., perceived 
mistake severity) is positively related to offenders’ fear. 
When individuals experience fear, they will experience a high level of arousal and feel 
their hearts pound very quickly (Frijda, 1986; Roseman, 2008). The action tendency of fear is 
primarily avoidance – associated with the action readiness of flight or freezing (Frijda, 1986; 
Izard & Ackerman, 2000; Kish-Gephart et al., 2009). Indeed, Gray (1990, 1994) proposed that 
signals of punishment will activate the behavioral inhibition system (BIS) or the fight/flight 
system (FFS) – both of which are linked to fear (Carver & White, 1994). The operation of the 
BIS will in turn lead to behavior inhibition (e.g., individuals may be inhibited from moving 
toward their goals; Carver & White, 1994; Gray, 1990, 1994) – this observation is in line with 
the proposition that fear is associated with an avoidance tendency.  
In addition, the operation of the BIS may lead to increased arousal and increased 
attention (Gray, 1990, 1994) – however, these responses are mainly directed towards the source 
of threat or threat-related information. Similarly, Izard and Ackerman (2000) note that fear leads 
to a narrowing of individuals’ attentional focus only toward the source of threat.  
The behavioral inhibition or the avoidance tendency that is associated with fear may then 
lead to a reduction in prosocial behavior (a behavior which calls for a social approach 
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orientation; von Dawans et al., 2012). Another plausible reason that fear may lead to reduced 
prosocial behavior is: when individuals experience fear, their attention may be so focused on the 
threatening source that they have little available attentional resources for other tasks (e.g., 
prosocial behavior) (Öhman, 2000).  
The experience of fear may also lead to less creativity. A reason for this is: when 
individuals are fearful, their attention is oriented toward the threat-related source and information 
– the dedication of attention towards threat-related information leaves them with less available 
resources for creativity task, thus leading to reduced creative performance (e.g., Öhman, 2000). 
Indeed, Izard and Ackerman (2000) have even described fear as leading to “tunnel vision”, since 
fearful people’s attentional focus is narrowed toward the source of threat only. This narrowing of 
cognitive attention will in turn lead to less cognitive flexibility, and thus less creativity (Baas et 
al., 2008). Moreover, that fear is associated with the avoidance tendency may be another 
plausible reason that fear leads to less creativity. Indeed, Baas et al.’s meta-analysis shows that 
fear, an emotion with an avoidance tendency and high activation level, tends to be associated 
with less creativity. In sum, committing mistakes may lead offenders to experience fear, which 
will in turn lead to low prosocial behavior and creativity.  
Attenuation of fear 
However, offenders’ experience of forgiveness from their victims implies that their 
victims have let go of the offenders’ mistakes and have cancelled the interpersonal debt against 
them – that is, their victims will not get even with them or no retaliation will be forthcoming 
from their victims (Gassin, 1998; Gray, 1990). This appraisal that the threat of retaliation has 
been removed will lead to a reduction in offenders’ fear emotion. Indeed, research shows that 
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offenders’ experience of being forgiven for their mistakes leads them to feel relief (Frijda et al., 
1989; Gassin, 1998; Gray, 1990; Shaver et al., 1987).  
Of greater interest in my dissertation, since the notion of being-forgiven for mistakes 
implies that the victims have cancelled the interpersonal debt and will not get even with the 
offenders, in this case, no matter how big or small the offenders’ mistakes is, this will have little 
effect on their feeling of fear (since their fear will be removed as no retaliation is forthcoming 
from the victims anyway). That is, the offenders’ experience of being forgiven for their mistakes 
may attenuate the positive relationship between their perception of mistake severity and fear.  
When fear is reduced, the avoidance action tendency will correspondingly be reduced, 
which will in turn counter the decrement in the offenders’ prosocial behavior and creativity – in 
other words, the offenders’ prosocial behavior and creativity will be higher when there is a 
reduction in their feeling of fear. Furthermore, because the victims are no longer a source of 
threat to the offenders as they have forgiven the offenders, the offenders’ attention no longer 
need to be consumed by the threat, thus leaving the offenders with more cognitive attentional 
resources for other concerns, which may lead to an increase in their prosocial behavior and 
creativity. In sum, offenders’ experience of being forgiven for their mistakes may attenuate the 
positive relationship between perceived mistake severity and fear, which will in turn have 
implications on their prosocial behavior and creativity (please refer to Figure 1).  
Hypothesis 1a: Forgiven-ness (i.e., the extent to which offenders have been 
forgiven by their victims for their mistakes) attenuates the positive relationship between 
offenders’ perceived mistake severity and fear. 
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Hypothesis 1b: Forgiven-ness attenuates the positive relationship between 
offenders’ perceived mistake severity and fear, and fear is in turn negatively related to offenders’ 
(i) prosocial behavior, and (ii) creativity. 
 
Shame 
The experience of committing mistakes may lead offenders to evaluate themselves 
negatively as they have failed to live up to their standards or obligations – which may elicit the 
shame emotion. In addition, the more severe the mistake, it implies that the more that the 
offenders have fallen short of the standard, and thus the more shame they will experience. 
Therefore, perceived mistake severity is positively related to shame.  
When individuals experience shame, they feel small and unworthy, and feel like 
shrinking or hiding (Frijda et al, 1989; Roseman et al., 1994; Tangney, 1991). The feeling of 
shame is thus associated with an avoidance tendency (Frijda et al., 1989; Sheikh & Janoff-
Bulman, 2010; Roseman et al., 1994; Tangney et al., 2007). Since the sense of self is evaluated 
negatively when individuals feel shame, this will have implications on their self-esteem (Izard & 
Ackerman, 2000) – for example, research shows that shame is associated with low self-esteem 
(Tangney & Dearing, 2002).  
The avoidance or withdrawal action tendency that is associated with shame may lead 
individuals to engage in less prosocial behavior. Furthermore, because individuals experiencing 
shame tend to focus on themselves and may be preoccupied with (trying to defend/protect) their 
damaged ego, they will have less attentional cognitive resources to fully engage with the external 




In addition, shame may lead to a reduction in creativity because of its avoidance action 
tendency (Baas et al., 2008). Another reason that shame leads to lower creativity is: individuals 
experiencing shame may focus much attention on themselves, and thus will have less cognitive 
resources available for other non-self-related tasks (e.g., creativity tasks). In sum, the experience 
of committing mistakes may lead offenders to experience the shame emotion, which will in turn 
lead to low prosocial behavior and creativity.  
Attenuation of shame 
However, the experience of being forgiven for their mistakes may attenuate offenders’ 
feeling of shame. The reason is that the self is implicated in shame – specifically, offenders feel a 
reduced sense of self-worth when they experience shame; however, when offenders are forgiven 
by their victims, this may convey the message to the offenders that they have intrinsic 
value/worth as a human being. For example, the offenders may reason that “if the victim can see 
enough good or decency in me to forgive me, then I may not be such a bad person after all” 
(Murphy & Hampton, 1988). This appraisal may then counter the decrement in the offenders’ 
self-esteem and thus reduce their feeling of shame. Furthermore, the offenders may deem that 
that their victims forgive them implies that their victims value the relationship with them and 
accept them (Gassin, 1998; Smedes, 1996). Such acceptance in the relationship may lead the 
offenders to have a more positive self-evaluation, and in turn reduce their feeling of shame.  
Of greater interest here, if the receipt of forgiveness leads to a restoration in the 
offenders’ sense of self-worth or self-esteem, then the magnitude of the mistakes will have little 
implication on their feeling of shame when they have been forgiven. That is, it would not matter 
whether the offenders had previously committed slight or severe mistakes since their sense of 
self-worth would be restored and shame removed when they have been forgiven – hence, the 
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severity of the mistake would have little effect on their feeling of shame when they have been 
forgiven. Thus, I hypothesize that the positive relationship between perceived mistake severity 
and shame may be attenuated when offenders have been forgiven by their victims. In other 
words, the Forgiven-ness may moderate the relationship between perceived mistake severity and 
shame. 
With a reduction in shame, the avoidance action tendency will be reduced and the 
offenders’ attention can be shifted from a focus on themselves to a focus on other matters. Thus, 
the reduction in shame may be associated with an increase in offenders’ prosocial behavior and 
creativity. In sum, Forgiven-ness may attenuate the positive relationship between perceived 
mistake severity and shame, which will in turn have implications on the offenders’ prosocial 
behavior and creativity (please refer to Figure 1). 
Hypothesis 2a: Forgiven-ness attenuates the positive relationship between 
offenders’ perceived mistake severity and shame. 
Hypothesis 2b: Forgiven-ness attenuates the positive relationship between 
offenders’ perceived mistake severity and shame, and shame is in turn negatively related to 
offenders’ (i) prosocial behavior, and (ii) creativity. 
 
Guilt  
The experience of committing mistakes may also lead offenders to appraise their 
behavior negatively and thus trigger their guilt emotion (Baumeister, Reis, & Delespaul, 1995; 
Berlinger, 2005; Delbanco & Bell, 2007; McGraw, 1987). Furthermore, the greater the mistake, 
it implies that the further the offenders’ behaviors have fallen short of a standard, and thus the 
more guilt they will feel. In other words, perceived mistake severity is positively related to guilt. 
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When experiencing guilt, individuals are motivated to make reparations for their bad 
actions or inactions; for example, research shows that individuals experiencing guilt may engage 
in various reparative and conciliatory behaviors, including making apologies and restitution, 
seeking forgiveness, and trying to repent of their ways (Baumeister et al., 1994; Hall & Fincham, 
2005; Roseman et al., 1994; Tangney, 1991). Thus, in contrast to other negative emotions, the 
experience of guilt generally gives rise to an approach tendency (rather than an avoidance 
tendency).  
The approach action tendency that is associated with guilt may lead to an increase in 
prosocial behavior; indeed, research shows that when individuals experience guilt, they are also 
likely to engage in prosocial behavior toward generalized others (Baumeister et al., 1994; Regan, 
1971). Another plausible reason why individuals experiencing guilt engage in more prosocial 
behavior is that such prosocial acts may help them to reduce their feelings of guilt – this is 
referred to as the guilt-reduction hypothesis in the literature (Regan 1971; Regan, Williams, & 
Sparling, 1972). Thus, committing mistakes may lead offenders to experience the guilt emotion, 
which will in turn lead to more prosocial behavior.  
Attenuation of guilt 
Research suggests that offenders may experience a reduction in guilt when they receive 
forgiveness (Gassin, 1998; Krause & Ellison, 2003; Witvliet et al., 2002; Zechmeister & 
Romero, 2002). One possible reason for this is that the offenders’ experience of being forgiven 
by their victims may facilitate the offenders’ self-forgiveness (Hall & Fincham, 2008), which 
may be associated with a reduction in their level of guilt. That is, as their victims let go of the 
mistakes (i.e., the victims cancel the interpersonal debt that has arisen because of the mistake; 
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Finkel et al., 2002), this helps the offenders to also let go of the mistakes that they had 
committed, which may in turn lead to a reduction/removal in the offenders’ feeling of guilt.  
As mentioned, perceived mistake severity is positively related to offenders’ feeling of 
guilt. Of interest here, it may also be possible that when offenders have been forgiven for their 
mistakes, if forgiveness removes/reduces the feeling of guilt, then it would not matter whether 
the offenders had committed slight or severe mistakes – the severity of the mistake will have 
little effect on their feeling of guilt since their guilt feeling will be removed anyway when they 
have been forgiven. Hence, offenders’ experience of forgiveness may attenuate the positive 
relationship between their perception of mistake severity and guilt: 
Hypothesis 3a: Forgiven-ness attenuates the positive relationship between 
offenders’ perceived mistake severity and guilt.  
Hypothesis 3b: Forgiven-ness attenuates the positive relationship between 
offenders’ perceived mistake severity and guilt, and guilt is in turn positively related to 
offenders’ prosocial behavior.  
 
Effect of Mistake- and Being-Forgiven-events on positive emotions 
In addition to reducing the effect of mistake severity on offenders’ negative emotions, the 
experience of being forgiven for mistakes is also an event that can lead offenders to experience 
positive emotions. Indeed, researchers have noted that forgiveness is a gift that victims offer to 
their offenders (Enright, 2001; Stanley, 1991). Thus, the event of receiving forgiveness from 
their victims may be appraised positively – favorable and beneficial for the offenders’ well-being 
– which will in turn lead the offenders to experience positive emotions (Shaver et al., 1987). 
Specifically, as gift recipients are happy and grateful for gifts, the offenders may also experience 
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happiness and gratitude in response to receiving the gift of forgiveness from their victims. I 
elaborate on each of these two positive emotions in turn.  
 
Happiness 
Offenders’ appraisal that they have received the benefit of being forgiven for their 
mistakes may lead them to experience happiness (Gassin, 1998). In addition, the more the 
offenders have been forgiven, the greater the benefit they have received, and thus the more 
happiness they feel. Therefore, the extent to which offenders have been forgiven for their 
mistakes is positively related to their feeling of happiness. 
When feeling happy, individuals “feel a sense of lightness in movements, feel like 
jumping up and down” (Roseman, 2008). The action readiness of happiness/joy is an approach 
tendency and expansiveness (in terms of both cognitive and social expansiveness – e.g., broader 
thought-action repertoire, wanting to share the joy with others) (Baas et al., 2008; Fredrickson, 
2001; Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener, 2005; Shaver et al., 1987). The approach and expansive 
action tendency of happiness may lead offenders to engage in more prosocial behavior – this 
proposition is in line with Fredrickson’s broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions 
(Fredrickson, 2001). Indeed, social psychology research shows a consistent relationship between 
people’s positive mood state and prosocial/helping behavior (Carlson, Charlin, & Miller, 1988; 
Eisenberg, 1991).  
In addition, the approach action tendency of happiness/joy may lead to increased 
creativity. Indeed, a meta-analysis of mood-creativity research documents that in general, 
positive mood leads to more creativity (as compared to mood-neutral states); however, these 
authors noted that the bulk of research on positive mood states pertain to joy (an emotion with an 
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approach tendency and high activation level; Baas et al., 2008). Indeed, Baas et al.’s later fine-
tuned their meta-analysis and showed that joy is positively correlated with creativity.  
Moreover, research suggests that individuals experiencing happiness have expansive 
thought patterns (Fredrickson, 2001). This cognitive expansiveness is associated with greater 
cognitive flexibility (e.g., happy individuals may come up with more inclusive categorization of 
items as they can envision how typical and non-typical items can belong to the same category), 
and thus enhanced creativity (Isen, 2000). This is another plausible explanation for the 
happiness—creativity relationship. In sum, the experience of being forgiven for their mistakes 
may lead offenders to experience happiness, which will in turn lead to more prosocial behavior 
and creativity.  
Accentuation of happiness 
Moreover, the effect of offenders’ Forgiven-ness perception on happiness will be stronger 
in the case of greater perceived mistake severity. The reason for this is that the more severe the 
mistake, the greater will be the benefit at each level of Forgiven-ness, and thus the more 
happiness the offenders will feel. In other words, perceived mistake severity will accentuate the 
positive relationship between Forgiven-ness and offenders’ feeling of happiness, which will in 
turn have implications on their prosocial behavior and creativity (please refer to Figure 2).  
Hypothesis 4a: Offender’s perception of mistake severity accentuates the positive 
relationship between Forgiven-ness and happiness.  
Hypothesis 4b: Perceived mistake severity accentuates the positive relationship 
between offenders’ Forgiven-ness and happiness, and happiness is in turn positively related to 





Offenders’ appraisal of receiving the gift of forgiveness from their victims may also lead 
them to experience gratitude. Research shows that, in general, individuals experience more 
gratitude when they value the gift, perceive that the gift is costly to their benefactors, perceive 
that their benefactors have offered the gift intentionally and voluntarily, and perceive that their 
benefactors have offered the gift out of goodwill (McCullough et al., 2001). Applied to the topic 
of receiving forgiveness, offenders are likely to experience more gratitude when they value the 
forgiveness, and perceive that their victims have offered the gift of forgiveness intentionally, 
voluntarily, and out of goodwill. Indeed, the more that offenders have been forgiven (i.e., the 
bigger the forgiveness gift), the more gratitude they experience. Therefore, the extent to which 
offenders have been forgiven for their mistakes (i.e., Forgiven-ness) is positively related to their 
gratitude feeling.   
In general, research shows that the gratitude emotion motivates individuals to engage in 
prosocial behavior toward their benefactors; this motivation to behave prosocially extends also to 
third parties (i.e., non-benefactors) (Bartlett & DeSteno, 2006; McCullough et al., 2001; 
McCullough, Kimeldorf, & Cohen, 2008). This suggests that gratitude may be associated with an 
approach tendency. Thus, the approach tendency may be one of the mechanisms that motivate 
grateful people to engage in prosocial behavior. Another plausible explanation of the gratitude—
prosocial behavior relationship pertains to the norm of reciprocity – that is, after receiving 
benefits, people’s feeling of gratitude may lead them to desire to benefit others as well. Applied 
to the topic of forgiveness, offenders’ experience of being forgiven for their mistakes may lead 




Accentuation of gratitude 
As mentioned, Forgiven-ness is positively related to gratitude. Furthermore, each 
Forgiven-ness level constitutes an even bigger gift within the context of severe mistakes (as 
compared to that of slight mistakes). Hence, offenders will feel even more gratitude at each level 
of Forgiven-ness for severe mistakes, as compared to that of slight mistakes. In other words, 
offenders’ perception of mistake severity will accentuate the positive relationship between 
Forgiven-ness and gratitude, which will in turn have implications on their prosocial behavior 
(please refer to Figure 2).  
Hypothesis 5a: Offenders’ perception of mistake severity accentuates the positive 
relationship between Forgiven-ness and gratitude.  
Hypothesis 5b: Offenders’ perceived mistake severity accentuates the positive 
relationship between Forgiven-ness and gratitude, and gratitude is in turn positively related to 
their prosocial behavior. 
In sum, Figures 1 and 2 depict my proposed frameworks on how offenders’ perception of 
mistake severity and Forgiven-ness may jointly lead to human flourishing outcomes for them. An 
emotion-based mediating mechanism underlies the relationship between the Forgiven-ness-by-
MistakeSeverity interaction effect and offenders’ prosocial behavior and creativity. Stated 
clearly, while Figure 1 depicts negative emotion states as mediating mechanisms, Figure 2 
depicts positive emotion states as mediating mechanisms and as human flourishing outcomes in 
their own right. My proposed framework is tested on two types of mistakes – unintentional work 
errors and interpersonal transgressions. Specifically, in my first study, I conducted an experiment 
to examine the consequences of offenders’ Forgiven-ness experience within the context of work 
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errors. In my second study, I conducted a survey to examine the consequences of offenders’ 




STUDY 1: DATA ENTRY ERROR EXPERIMENT (DEE) EXPERIMENT 
Method 
Sample 
A total of 176 undergraduates from a local university participated in this study. However, 
only 88 research participants believed the experiment (please refer to the Footnote and 
Supplementary Tables for a description of the research participants who believed versus those 
who suspected the experimental manipulation). This study thus contains only 88 cases of usable 
data – therefore, analyses are conducted on only these 88 research participants who believed (i.e., 
did not suspect) the experiment. The mean age of the 88 research participants is 20.91 (SD = 
1.59); 53.4% of the participants are females. Research participants either earned course credits or 
received 10 Singapore dollars for taking part in this study. 
 
Procedure 
The title of the survey that was reflected to the participants when they signed up for the 
study is ‘Survey Questions and Task Performance’. There was only one research participant in 
each session.  
When the research participants first arrived for the session, the experimenter asked them 
to do a task for his/her colleague (who – unknown to the participants – was actually a research 
confederate) as the colleague needed to rush for an important presentation with a committee of 
professors. Participants were told that the task with the experimenter’s colleague will take only a 
short duration as the colleague would be rushing off soon. Furthermore, participants were 
instructed to go back to the experimenter’s room to do the formal research study after doing the 
 36 
 
task for the experimenter’s colleague. After instructing the participants, the experimenter 
directed them to his/her colleague’s room (i.e., the research confederate room). 
Procedurally, at the research confederate’s room: when the research participants turned 
up at the confederate’s room, the confederate told them “Please enter the data from this stack of 
surveys into the statistical spreadsheet accurately. Accuracy is extremely important when you 
enter the data as the results need to be accurate for me to make proper projections about the 
viability of my research study as I’m applying for a $500/$2000 grant money funding for my 
project. Please also hurry with this because I need the data urgently as I’m rushing off for a 
presentation.”  
The research participants then entered the data from the stack of surveys on a computer; 
meanwhile, the confederate pretended to type on his/her laptop to lead the participants to believe 
that he/she was really rushing out for a presentation. After the research participants finished the 
data entry, the confederate then saved the data, but – unknown to the participants – opened 
another fake dataset (which is my pre-created dataset that contains faked errors). With the fake 
dataset, the confederate then performed the data analysis. The statistical program then revealed 
that there were errors in the data.  
After “realizing the errors”, the confederate enacted one of the following three 
Forgivenness treatment conditions (note that the sections in square brackets are the same across 
the three Forgiven-ness treatment conditions) (the Forgiven-ness experimental manipulations 





Forgiven condition: In this condition, the confederate said to the research participants 
“[oh no… there are many mistakes… now I can’t use this data… Shucks – now I will not be able 
to make it for my presentation… there goes my $500/$2000 grant money…]”. Then the 
confederate took a deep breath and told the participants “Don’t worry about it.” Then the 
confederate packed his/her belongings and walked towards the door. Just before reaching the 
door, the confederate sincerely told the research participants “hey, all the best for your work. See 
you around.” The confederate then exited the room.  
Control condition:  In this condition, the confederate said to the research participants 
“[oh no… there are many mistakes… now I can’t use this data… Shucks – now I will not be able 
to make it for my presentation… there goes my $500/$2000 grant money…]…… sigh…”. The 
confederate then packed his/her belongings and exited the room. 
Unforgiven condition: In this condition, the confederate said to the research participants 
“[oh no… there are many mistakes… now I can’t use this data… Shucks – now I will not be able 
to make it for my presentation… there goes my $500/$2000 grant money…]…… wow… how 
can you make up for this problem?  I hope you will make many mistakes in your own work too.” 
Then the confederate packed his/her belongings and exited the room.  
After the research participants completed the scenario with the confederate, they went 
back to the experimenter room – where the experimenter then administered some survey 
questions and tasks. Specifically, the experimenter administered personality surveys, state 
emotions survey, paper-clip creativity task, task to measure prosocial behavior (i.e., ask 
participants how much time they would like to volunteer for future research projects), surveys 
that pertained to the data entry error event (e.g., perception of the severity of the event, 
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perception of the extent to which they had been forgiven for the error), and demographic 
information. 
For the paper-clip creativity task, the research participants were instructed “For this task, 
you will be given the name of an object, and your task is to come up with as many uses as 
possible for the object as you can. Don’t be concerned about the quality of the uses you come up 
with. The uses can be ordinary or unusual. It is, however, important that you write down as many 
uses as you can within 10 minutes. We are interested in the number of uses that can be generated 
for this object.” The instructions were adopted from Williams and Karau (1991). 
After the research participants completed all the surveys and tasks, they were debriefed 
about the experiment.  
 
Measures 
Forgiven-ness treatment variable (manipulation check).  There are three levels of the 
Forgiven-ness treatment variable – Unforgiven, Control, and Forgiven conditions (please refer to 
the Procedures section for information about the respective conditions). As a manipulation 
check, I used the Being Forgiven Scale (BFS) measure to assess if the Forgiven-ness treatment 
variable was effective. Specifically, the BFS measure consists of 17-items that assess offenders’ 
perception of the extent to which they have been forgiven by their victims for their mistakes, 
errors, or transgressions. Some example items in the BFS measure are “This person (i.e., the 
experimenter’s victim-colleague) lets go of the hurt that I’ve caused him/her”, “this person is 
hostile toward me” (reverse-coded), and “this person has goodwill toward me”. These BFS items 
are measured on a 7-point Likert-scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). The reliability 
Cronbach alpha for the Being Forgiven Scale is .91.  
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As a manipulation check, the BFS measure shows that the respective Forgiven-ness 
treatment conditions are effective. Specifically, ANOVA shows that the three treatment 
conditions are significantly different from one another, F(2, 85) = 15.07, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.26. Bonferroni and Tukey HSD post hoc tests further show that the means of each Forgiven-ness 
treatment condition are statistically significantly different from one another. To elaborate, the 
BFS score of the Forgiven condition (M = 3.86, SD = .92, n = 35) is statistically significantly 
greater than that of the Control condition (M = 3.22, SD = .70, n = 30) (p < .01 for Bonferroni 
and Tukey HSD tests); the BFS score of the Control condition is statistically significantly greater 
than that of the Unforgiven condition (M = 2.66, SD = .82, n = 23) (p = .05 for Bonferroni test;  p 
< .05 for Tukey HSD test); and the BFS score of the Forgiven condition is statistically 
significantly greater than that of the Unforgiven condition (p < .001 for Bonferroni and Tukey 
HSD tests). 
Grant money.  Initially, a 3 (Forgiven-ness treatment: Forgiven vs Control vs 
Unforgiven) X 2 (Grant money: $500 vs $2000) between-subject research design was used. The 
grant money variable was designed to manipulate the Severity of the mistake event. However, 
independent samples t-test shows that there is non-significant difference between the two levels 
of the grant money treatment variable. Specifically, t-test shows that the severity score of the 
$500 grant money condition (M = 4.10, SD = .76) is non-significantly different from that of the 
$2000 grant money condition (M = 4.10, SD = .86), [t(82) = .01, p > .05] – therefore, I collapsed 
the two levels of this variable. A plausible reason that the difference between these two 
conditions of grant money is statistically non-significant is due to a ceiling effect – in the sense 
that research participants are led to believe that they had caused a stranger (i.e., the research 
confederate) to lose $500 or $2000 – both of which could be considered a substantial amount of 
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money to undergraduates (especially when they have led a stranger to lose that amount of 
money). Thus, I collapsed the two levels of this factor, and examined the research participants’ 
perception of error severity instead – since there will be variance on this variable as individuals 
usually perceive objective events differently; moreover, as this variable is a continuous variable, 
it offers my analysis more statistical power, and thereby allows for a more rigorous test of my 
hypotheses.  
Perceived error severity.  Participants were instructed to recall the data entry event, and 
to think about their experience with the confederate in this event, and then rate their perceived 
severity of the error event. Perceived error severity was measured by 3 items. The 3 items in my 
experiment are “how serious was the hurtful event for this person?”, “how deeply did you hurt 
this person or his/her goals?”, and “how painful would the event be for this person?”. These 
items were measured on a 5-point Likert-scale (1 = not at all, 3 = somewhat, 5 = very much). The 
reliability Cronbach alpha for this perceived severity scale is .79.  
 Fear.  Participants were asked to indicate how they were feeling at the moment. Fear was 
measured with 3 items – fearful, scared, and afraid. These items were adopted from Izard and 
colleagues’ (Izard, Libero, Putnam, & Haynes, 1993) Differential Emotions Scale (DES-IV); 
however, I modified the instructions and the rating scale so that I can tap the state emotion. The 3 
items in my experiment were measured on a 7-point Likert-scale (1 = not at all, 4 = somewhat, 7 
= extremely). The reliability Cronbach alpha for this fear scale is .87.  
Shame.  Participants were asked to indicate how they were feeling at the moment. Shame 
was measured with 3 items – ashamed, small, and worthless. These items were adopted from 
Marschall and colleagues’ (Marschall, Sanftner, & Tangney, 1994) State Shame and Guilt Scale, 
and Orth and colleagues’ (Orth, Berking, & Burkhardt, 2006) Event-related Shame and Guilt 
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scale. The 3 items in my experiment were measured on a 7-point Likert-scale (1 = not at all, 4 = 
somewhat, 7 = extremely). The reliability Cronbach alpha for this shame scale is .77.  
Guilt.  Participants indicated how they were feeling at the moment. Guilt was measured 
with 3 items – guilty, bad, and regretful. These items were adopted from Marschall et al.’s 
(1994) State Shame and Guilt Scale, and Orth et al.’s (2006) Event-related Shame and Guilt 
scale. The 3 items in my experiment were measured on a 7-point Likert-scale (1 = not at all, 4 = 
somewhat, 7 = extremely). The reliability Cronbach alpha for this guilt scale is .80.  
Gratitude.  Participants indicated how they were feeling at the moment. Gratitude was 
measured with 3 items – appreciative, grateful, and thankful. These items were adopted from the 
Gratitude adjective checklist (GAC) (Froh, Fan, Emmons, Bono, Huebner, & Watkins, 2011; 
Tsang, 2006; McCullough et al., 2001). The 3 items in my experiment were measured on a 7-
point Likert-scale (1 = not at all, 4 = somewhat, 7 = extremely). The reliability Cronbach alpha 
for this gratitude scale is .92.  
Happiness.  Participants indicated how they were feeling at the moment. Happiness was 
measured with 3 items – happy, glad, and joyful. These items are adopted from Izard et al.’s 
(1993) Differential Emotions Scale (DES-IV); however, I modified the instructions and the 
rating scale so that I can tap the state emotion. The 3 items in my experiment were measured on a 
7-point Likert-scale (1 = not at all, 4 = somewhat, 7 = extremely). The reliability Cronbach alpha 
for this joy scale is .88.  
Prosocial behavior (volunteering for research project).  Prosocial behavior was 
measured by asking research participants to indicate how much time they were willing to 
volunteer to participate in other research studies. The range of options provided was from 0 
minute to 120 minutes (where each option was set at 15 minutes apart). My measure of prosocial 
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behavior is modified from Donnerstein and colleagues’ (Donnerstein, Donnerstein, & Munger, 
1975). 
Creativity - fluency.  Fluency for the paper clip creativity task was assessed by counting 
the number of non-redundant ideas that each participant came up with (Baas et al., 2008; Runco, 
2004). Three independent coders assessed this fluency measure, and the inter-rater reliability for 
this measure is .99. 
Creativity - flexibility.  Flexibility for the paper clip task was assessed by counting the 
number of response categories that each participant’s ideas spanned (Baas et al., 2008). Three 
independent coders assessed this flexibility measure, and the inter-rater reliability for this 
measure is .83. 
Creativity - originality.  Originality for the paper clip task was assessed by counting the 
number of unusual/uncommon ideas that each participant came up with (Baas et al., 2008; 
Mumford & Gustafson, 1988; Runco, 2004) (where the unusualness of an idea is defined in this 
study as an idea that occurs in 5% or less of the sample (Plucker & Renzulli, 1999) – however, 
since 5% of my sample of 88 is 4.4, I rounded the number up to 5). That is, an idea was 
considered unusual if it occurred 5 times or less in this study. Thus, for each participant, the 
originality score was computed as the total number of original ideas that he/she came up with. 
Only one coder assessed this originality measure.  
Results and Discussion 
Analyses are conducted on only the 88 research participants who believed the 
experiment. Means, standard deviations, correlations, and internal consistency reliabilities are 




Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
I conducted hierarchical regression analyses to test my hypotheses. Because the 
Forgiven-ness treatment variable is a categorical variable, I used two dummy codes to represent 
the three levels of the Forgiven-ness treatment variable in my regression analysis. Specifically, 
‘Dummy1(ctrl)’ represents the Control group, ‘Dummy2(uf)’ represents the Unforgiven group; 
the Forgiven group serves as the reference group in the analyses. That is, on (Dummy1, 
Dummy2) respectively, the Forgiven treatment group is represented by (0, 0); the Control 
treatment group is represented by (1, 0); and the Unforgiven treatment group is represented by 
(0, 1). For the primary regression model analyses, the main effect predictors (i.e., Forgiven-ness 
treatment variable as represented by two dummy codes, and Perceived Severity centered 
variable) are entered in the first step, and the Forgiven-ness-by-Severity (centered) interaction 
effects are entered in the second step. Regression results are shown in Tables 2 to 7.  
According to Table 2, the Forgiven-ness-by-Severity interaction effect on fear is 
statistically significant (BSeverity*Dummy1(ctrl) = .65, p = .05; BSeverity*Dummy2(uf) = 1.10, p < .05). In 
light of this statistically significant interaction effect on fear, I re-analyzed the data to produce 
the simple slopes for each Forgiven-ness treatment group (see Table 5) to further examine the 
interaction effect. Table 5 shows that in the Unforgiven condition, perceived severity of the error 
event is statistically significantly positively related with fear (simple slope B = 1.35, p < .01); in 
the Control condition, perceived severity is significantly positively related with fear (simple 
slope B = .90, p < .001); however, in the Forgiven condition, the relationship between perceived 
severity and fear is statistically non-significant (simple slope B = .25, ns). Overall, this pattern of 
results provides support for Hypothesis 1a that the Forgiven-ness attenuates the positive 
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relationship between perceived severity of the error event and their feeling of fear. Figure 3 
depicts this pattern of results.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------- 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
-------------------------------- 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
--------------------------------- 
By contrast, Table 2 shows that the Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction effect on shame 
is statistically non-significant (BSeverity*Dummy1(ctrl) = .46, p > .05; BSeverity*Dummy2(uf) = .81, p > .05) 
– which implies that the perceived severity slope (on shame) in the Forgiven treatment group 
does not differ significantly from those in the Control or Unforgiven treatment groups. Since the 
interaction effect is non-significant, I then examine if the lower-order main effect predictors have 
any influence on the experience of shame. Regression analysis (see the results in Step 1) shows 
that for the Forgiven treatment group (i.e., the reference group in our analysis), perceived 
severity of the error event is positively related to shame (B = .55, p < .01). However, because 
Forgiven-ness does not attenuate this perceived severity-shame relationship, hypotheses 2a, 2bi 
and 2bii are not supported.  
In addition, Table 2 shows that the Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction effect on guilt is 
statistically non-significant (BSeverity*Dummy1(ctrl) = .32, p > .05; BSeverity*Dummy2(uf) = .60, p > .05) – 
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which implies that the perceived severity slope (on guilt) in the Forgiven treatment group does 
not differ significantly from those in the Control or Unforgiven treatment groups. Since the 
interaction effect is non-significant, I then examine if the lower-order main effect predictors have 
any influence on the experience of guilt. Regression analysis (see the results in Step 1) shows 
that for the Forgiven treatment group (i.e., the reference group), perceived severity of the error 
event is positively related to guilt (B = .93, p < .001). However, because Forgiven-ness does not 
attenuate this perceived severity—guilt relationship, hypotheses 3a and 3b are not supported.  
In general, the pattern of interaction effect with regard to the negative emotion states 
involves Perceived Error Severity as the main effect predictor and Forgiven-ness treatment 
variable as the moderator predictor. By contrast, the pattern of interaction effect with regard to 
the positive emotion states involves Forgiven-ness treatment variable as the main effect 
predictor, and Perceived Error Severity as the moderator of the Forgiven-ness—positive emotion 
state relationship. For example, in the case of gratitude, I hypothesized that the Forgiven-ness 
variable will have a main effect on gratitude, and that the perceived mistake severity (i.e., 
perceived error severity in Study 1) will moderate the Forgiven-ness—gratitude relationship.  
However, Table 3 shows that the Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction effect on gratitude 
is statistically non-significant (BSeverity*Dummy1(ctrl) = .33, p > .05; BSeverity*Dummy2(uf) = .89, p > .05) 
– which implies that the difference in gratitude scores among the various Forgiven-ness 
treatment conditions do not depend on the level of perceived error severity. Therefore, 
hypotheses 5a and 5b are not supported. Since the Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction effect is 
non-significant, I then examine if the lower-order predictors have any influence on the 
experience of gratitude (please refer to Step 1 results). The results show that the overall 
regression model containing the Forgiven-ness main effect on gratitude is statistically non-
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significant – F(3, 79) = 1.91, ns. In sum, regression analyses show that neither the interaction 
effect nor the Forgiven-ness main effect predictors account for a significant proportion of 
variance in gratitude. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
-------------------------------- 
For happiness, I hypothesized that the Forgiven-ness treatment variable will have a main 
effect on happiness, and that the perceived error severity will moderate the Forgiven-ness—
happiness relationship. However, Table 3 shows that the Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction 
effect on happiness is statistically non-significant (BSeverity*Dummy1(ctrl) = .05, p > .05; 
BSeverity*Dummy2(uf) = 1.17, p < .06, but overall F(5, 77) = 2.08, ns) – which implies that the 
difference in happiness scores among the various Forgiven-ness treatment conditions do not 
depend on the level of perceived error severity. Therefore, hypotheses 4a, 4bi, and 4bii are not 
supported. Since Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction effect is non-significant, I then examine if 
the lower-order predictors have any influence on the experience of happiness (please refer to 
Step 1 results). The results show that the overall regression model containing the Forgiven-ness 
main effect on happiness is statistically non-significant – F(3, 79) = 2.09, ns. In sum, regression 
analyses show that neither the interaction effect nor the Forgiven-ness main effect predictors 
account for the variance in happiness. 
For creativity, Table 4 shows that the Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction effects are 
statistically non-significantly associated with (i) fluency (BSeverity*Dummy1(ctrl) = .96, p > .05; 
BSeverity*Dummy2(uf) = -2.22, p > .05), (ii) flexibility (BSeverity*Dummy1(ctrl) = .59, p > .05; 
BSeverity*Dummy2(uf) = -.16, p > .05), and (iii) originality (BSeverity*Dummy1(ctrl) = .12, p > .05; 
 47 
 
BSeverity*Dummy2(uf) = -1.02, p > .05). Furthermore, that all three dimensions of creativity are non-
significantly correlated with the various emotions states (e.g., fear) shows that all the mediated 
moderation hypotheses for creativity – hypotheses 1bii, 2bii, 4bii – are not supported. Since the 
Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction effects are non-significant, I then examine if the lower-
order predictors have any influence on the various aspects of creativity (please refer to the 
respective Step 1 results in Table 4). Table 4 shows that the overall regression models containing 
the main effects are statistically non-significant for all creativity aspects. Specifically, (a) for 
fluency – F(3, 79) = .17, ns; (b) for flexibility – F(3, 76) = .55, ns; (c) for originality – F(3, 76) = 
1.98, ns. In sum, regression analyses show that neither the interaction effect nor main effect 
predictors account for a significant proportion of variance in the three creativity dimensions.   
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Prosocial behavior 
According to Table 4, the Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction effect on prosocial 
behavior is marginally statistically significant. Specifically, Table 4 shows that the difference in 
the regression coefficient (or the slope of perceived error severity on prosocial behavior) 
between the Forgiven treatment group and the Unforgiven treatment group is statistically non-
significant (BSeverity*Dummy2(uf) = 2.44, p > .05); however, the difference in the regression 
coefficient between the Forgiven treatment group and the Control treatment group is statistically 
significant (BSeverity*Dummy1(ctrl) = 17.00, p < .05).  
Furthermore, using an alternative dummy coding scheme with the control group as 
reference group, Table 6 shows that the difference in the regression coefficient (or the slope of 
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perceived severity on prosocial behavior) between the Control treatment group and the 
Unforgiven treatment group is statistically non-significant (BSeverity*AltDummy(uf) = -14.55, p > .05). 
In this case, since the perceived severity—prosocial behavior slope in the Unforgiven condition 
is non-significantly different from their counterpart slopes in the Forgiven or Control conditions, 
I focus my discussion on the source of “statistically significantly interesting” findings – that is, 
how the perceived error severity—prosocial behavior slopes are different in the Forgiven 
condition versus the Control condition, and what may explain for the perceived severity—
prosocial behavior slopes in the Forgiven and Control conditions.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
-------------------------------- 
To elaborate, I re-analyzed the data to produce the simple slopes for the respective 
Forgiven-ness treatment groups (see Table 5). Table 5 shows that in the Forgiven condition, the 
relationship between perceived severity of the error and prosocial behavior is statistically non-
significant (simple slope B = -2.44, ns); however, in the Control condition, perceived severity is 
statistically significantly positively related with prosocial behavior (simple slope B = 14.55, p < 
.01). This pattern of results is also depicted in Figure 4. The pattern of perceived severity—
prosocial behavior slopes in the Forgiven versus Control conditions suggests an psychological 
closure or equilibrium story, which I will elaborate on in the discussion section. 
--------------------------------- 






I conducted mediation analysis to further investigate the effect of Forgivenness-by-
Severity interaction on prosocial behavior. According to Baron and Kenny (1986), for mediation 
to occur, the predictors should be significantly related to the mediator and the outcome variable. 
In light of this, the aforementioned findings suggest that only one variable qualifies for a 
mediator test for the relationship between Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction and prosocial 
behavior – that is, fear. (Specifically, the aforementioned findings reveal that the Forgivenness-
by-Severity interaction effect is statistically significantly related with fear and prosocial 
behavior).  
Table 7 sheds light on the mediation analyses. According to Table 7, because the 
relationship between fear and prosocial behavior is statistically non-significant (B = .77, ns), fear 
does not mediate the relationship between Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction and prosocial 
behavior. In general, all mediated moderation hypotheses for prosocial behavior (i.e., hypotheses 
1bi, 2bi, 3b, 4bi, and 5b) are not supported.   
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
------------------------------- 
Discussion for DEE Experiment 
Overall, the data entry error (DEE) experiment shows that offenders’ experience of being 
forgiven for unintentional work errors does not tell a human flourishing story. Specifically, the 
DEE experiment shows that the perceived error severity and Forgiven-ness main effects and 
interaction effects on positive emotions (i.e., gratitude and happiness) and creativity are 
statistically non-significant. Therefore, neither error severity perception nor offenders’ 
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experience of being forgiven/unforgiven for their errors has implications on these emotion- and 
cognitive-based human flourishing outcomes.  
Moreover, the pattern of statistically significant Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction 
effect does not provide support for the human flourishing story with regard to prosocial behavior. 
Rather, further examination of this statistically significant Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction 
effect shows that the pattern of perceived severity—prosocial behavior slopes in the Forgiven 
versus Control conditions suggests a psychological closure or equilibrium story: first, when 
offenders have been forgiven for their errors, the debt that arises from the errors is cancelled (for 
example, the research confederate tells the subjects ‘don’t worry about it’ in the Forgiven 
condition), and subjects may experience a sense of psychological closure to the event (Skitka, 
Bauman, & Mullen, 2004; Zechmeister & Romero, 2002). Since there is psychological closure, 
no matter whether they had committed slight or serious errors (stated more precisely – errors 
with slight or serious effects), subjects do not have to compensate in order to restore a sense of 
equilibrium and attain closure, thus error severity is non-significantly associated with prosocial 
behavior.  
By contrast, in the Control condition, the research confederate just sighs after “realizing” 
the errors and leaves the room. This plausibly creates an uncomfortable situation for the subjects 
as they have no sense of closure. That is, left with a mess that they have “created”, and not 
having something being done to them (by the confederate) that will allow them to restore a sense 
of equilibrium and attain closure, subjects may instead seize the opportunity to volunteer for 
future research projects as a means to compensate in order to restore a sense of equilibrium and 
attain psychological closure. Furthermore, the more severe subjects perceive their errors to be, 
the more they feel compelled to compensate, and thus the more they volunteer to participate in 
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research projects (which is an indicator of prosocial behavior in my experiment) in order to 
restore a sense of equilibrium. In other words, it is plausible that whether and the extent to which 
subjects volunteer to participate in research projects are motivated by their desire to have a sense 
of equilibrium and attain psychological closure.  
Indeed, the equilibrium or psychological closure story that is proposed to underlie the 
pattern of prosocial behavior results in the Forgiven versus the Control conditions may be 
particularly relevant in my experiment because of the nature of the prosocial behavior indicator 
(i.e., ‘volunteering for research studies’) in my experiment. Specifically, where subjects have 
incurred a social debt by committing errors, a way to attain psychological closure is to repay the 
debt by engaging in prosocial behavior, particularly if the form of pro-socialness is in the area 
where they incurred the debt (in this case, the subjects incurred a debt by committing work errors 
within a research study, and volunteering to participate in other research studies is a close form 
of compensation). Future research should put this post-hoc psychological closure explanation to 
further empirical testing. In addition, a more rigorous test of my original hypothesis pertaining to 
whether and how the Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction effect will have implications on 
prosocial behavior may be accomplished by using other relatively unrelated forms of prosocial 
behavior – e.g., charitable donations to non-profit organizations – as the criterion variable. 
However, for this current experiment, the form of the Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction effect 
does not support the human flourishing story with regard to prosocial behavior.  
In addition, this experiment shows that whether offenders have been forgiven for their 
errors or not does not affect the relationship between their perception of error severity and their 
feelings of guilt and shame. Indeed, the beneficial effect of experiencing forgiveness for 
unintended work errors pertains primarily to offenders’ fear emotion – specifically, the result 
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shows that the offenders’ experience of being-forgiven for errors attenuates the relationship 
between perceived severity of the error event and their feeling of fear. Alternatively stated, the 
severity of the errors that offenders had committed is positively related to their feeling of fear 
only when they have not been forgiven for their errors (i.e., in the Unforgiven and Control 
conditions in this case); when offenders have been forgiven, it does not matter how big or small 
their error is since the interpersonal debt that has arisen from the errors is cancelled and no 
retaliation is forthcoming – thus, the magnitude of error severity has no (statistically) significant 
implication on offenders’ experience of fear when they have been forgiven. In other words, 
experiencing forgiveness from their victims removes the effect that error severity has on 
offenders’ feeling of fear. 
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STUDY 2: INTERPERSONAL TRANSGRESSION SURVEY (ITS) 
 In this study, I examined offenders’ Being-Forgiven experience within the context of 
interpersonal transgressions. This is an important line of investigation as interpersonal 
transgressions occur at work (e.g., injustice, abuse, incivility, interpersonal counter-productive 
work behaviors – Chan & McAllister, 2014; Greenberg, 2006; Hershcovis, & Barling, 2010; Lim 
& Cortina, 2005; Robinson & Bennett, 1995). With interpersonal transgressions, the issue of 
forgiveness becomes relevant as it is important that the offenders not be handicapped by their 
transgressions (Arendt, 1958) and are able to move on as they still need to work and work 
together with their victim-employees. This underscores the importance of offenders’ experience 
of forgiveness in the workplace. Hence, in this study, I conducted a survey to examine the 
consequences of offenders’ Forgiven-ness experience within the context of interpersonal 
transgressions – specifically, the implication of forgiveness for offenders’ emotions, prosocial 
behavior/organizational citizenship behavior, and creativity. 
Method 
Sample 
187 undergraduates from a local university participated in this survey study. The mean 
age of the research participants is 20.26 (SD = 1.64); 68.4% of the participants are females. 
Research participants were recruited from the subject pool of an introductory business course, 
and they earned course credits for taking part in this study. 
Procedure 
In this survey, research participants were first instructed “Please recall the most serious 
event where you have hurt or harmed someone in the past six months. The hurt or harm may be 
of any type – for example, physical hurt, psychological or emotional hurt, hurting someone’s 
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goals or interests.  However, for the purpose of this survey, the person whom you’ve hurt must 
not be a stranger. Try to visualize in your mind what happened during the event – the interactions 
you had with the person whom you’ve hurt, and describe the event in two paragraphs.” These 
instructions were modified from McCullough and colleagues (McCullough, Rachal, Sandage, 
Worthington, Jr., Brown, & Hight, 1998: 1589), and adapted from other sources (e.g., Kelley, 
1998; McCullough et al., 1997; Wallace et al., 2008). After describing this event, participants 
rated the extent to which their victims forgave them, and indicated the emotions and responses 
that they had after realizing the extent to which they had been forgiven for their focal 
interpersonal transgression. Lastly, participants filled in personality and demographic 
information.  
Measures 
Perceived transgression/hurt severity.  Research participants were instructed to recall 
what their thoughts about the interpersonal transgression/hurt-related event were at the time that 
it happened, and then provide ratings on the perceived severity of the transgression/hurt-related 
event. Specifically, perceived transgression/hurt severity was measured by the following 3 items: 
“how serious was the hurtful event for Person A (i.e., the victim)?”, “how deeply did you hurt 
Person A or his/her interests?”, and “how painful would the event be for Person A?”. I created 
these items from various sources (e.g., Exline et al., 2008; McCullough et al., 1998). These three 
items were measured on a 5-point Likert-scale (1 = not at all, 3 = somewhat, 5 = very much). The 
reliability Cronbach alpha for this perceived transgression severity scale is .85.  
Forgiven-ness.  The Being Forgiven Scale (BFS) was used to assess Forgiven-ness. 
Specifically, the BFS consists of 17-items that assess offenders’ perception of the extent to 
which they have been forgiven by their victims for their mistakes, errors, or transgressions. Some 
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example items in the BFS measure are “Person A has let go of the hurt that I’ve caused him/her”, 
“Person A holds a grudge against me” (reverse-coded), and “Person A has goodwill toward me”. 
These BFS items were measured on a 7-point Likert-scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly 
agree). The reliability Cronbach alpha for the Being Forgiven Scale is .95.  
 Fear.  Participants were asked to indicate how they felt when they first realized the extent 
to which their victims had forgiven them for the interpersonal transgression event. Fear was 
measured with 3 items – fearful, scared, and afraid. These items were adopted from Izard and 
colleagues’ (1993) Differential Emotions Scale (DES-IV); however, I modified the instructions 
and the rating scale so that I can tap the state emotion. These three items in my survey were 
measured on a 7-point Likert-scale (1 = not at all, 4 = somewhat, 7 = extremely). The reliability 
Cronbach alpha for this fear scale in my survey is .89.  
Shame.  Participants were asked to indicate how they felt when they first realized the 
extent to which their victims had forgiven them for the interpersonal transgression event. Shame 
was measured with 3 items – ashamed, small, and worthless. These items were adopted from 
Marschall et al.’s (1994) State Shame and Guilt Scale, and Orth et al.’s (2006) Event-related 
Shame and Guilt scale. These three items in my survey were measured on a 7-point Likert-scale 
(1 = not at all, 4 = somewhat, 7 = extremely). The reliability Cronbach alpha for this shame scale 
is .70.  
Guilt.  Participants indicated how they felt when they first realized the extent to which 
their victims had forgiven them for the transgression event. Guilt was measured with 3 items – 
guilty, bad, and regretful. These items were adopted from Marschall et al.’s (1994) State Shame 
and Guilt Scale, and Orth et al.’s (2006) Event-related Shame and Guilt scale. These three items 
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were measured on a 7-point Likert-scale (1 = not at all, 4 = somewhat, 7 = extremely). The 
reliability Cronbach alpha for this guilt scale in my survey is .82.  
Gratitude.  Participants indicated how they felt when they first realized the extent to 
which their victims had forgiven them for the transgression event. Gratitude was measured with 
3 items – appreciative, grateful, and thankful. These items were adopted from the Gratitude 
adjective checklist (GAC) (Froh et al., 2011; Tsang, 2006; McCullough et al., 2001). These three 
items in my survey were measured on a 7-point Likert-scale (1 = not at all, 4 = somewhat, 7 = 
extremely). The reliability Cronbach alpha for this gratitude scale is .94.  
Happiness.  Participants indicated how they felt when they first realized the extent to 
which their victims had forgiven them for the transgression event. Happiness was measured with 
3 items – happy, glad, and joyful. These items are adopted from Izard et al.’s (1993) Differential 
Emotions Scale (DES-IV); however, I modified the instructions and the rating scale so that I can 
tap the state emotion. These items in my survey were measured on a 7-point Likert-scale (1 = not 
at all, 4 = somewhat, 7 = extremely). The reliability Cronbach alpha for this happiness scale in 
my survey is .91.  
Prosocial behavior.  Participants indicated what their responses were 24 hours after they 
first realized the extent to which their victims had forgiven them. Specifically, with the sentence 
stem “Within 24 hours after I first realized the extent to which Person A has forgiven (or not 
forgiven) me….”, prosocial behavior was measured with the following 4 items: “I helped 
someone”, “I shared personal resources with someone”, “I made adjustments to accommodate 
someone”, and “I did something good for someone”. Except for the last item, the former three 
items are largely adapted and modified from Lee and Allen’s (2002) Organizational Citizenship 
Behavior – Interpersonal scale. The four prosocial behavior items in this survey were measured 
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on a 7-point Likert-scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). The reliability Cronbach alpha for this 
prosocial behavior scale is .83. 
Creativity.  I created a creativity scale for this survey. Participants were asked to indicate 
what their responses were 24 hours after they first realized the extent to which their victims had 
forgiven them. Specifically, with the sentence stem “Within 24 hours after I first realized the 
extent to which Person A has forgiven (or not forgiven) me….”, creativity was measured with 
the following 3 items: “I was creative”, “I came up with many ideas”, and “I was innovative”. 
These creativity items were measured on a 7-point Likert-scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very much); 
also, the ‘not applicable’ option was available for this creativity scale so that participants could 
select this option if creativity was not applicable to them at that time (e.g., if they were not 
engaged in any tasks). The reliability Cronbach alpha for this creativity scale is .96. 
Control variable.  Positive affectivity (PA) and negative affectivity (NA) (Watson, Clark, 
& Tellegen, 1988) were used as control variables in all the regression analyses. The reliability 
for the PA scale in this study is .83; the reliability for the NA scale in this study is .86.   
 
Results 
Means, standard deviations, correlations, and internal consistency reliabilities are 
presented in Table 8.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
-------------------------------- 
I conducted hierarchical regression analyses to test my hypotheses. For each regression 
analysis, the control variables of positive affectivity and negative affectivity are entered in the 
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first step, the main effect predictors (Forgiven-ness and Perceived Transgression/Hurt Severity) 
are entered in the second step, and the Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction effect is entered in 
the last step. Since all the analyses involve tests of interaction effect, I centered the Perceived 
Transgression Severity and Forgiven-ness main effect predictors and their corresponding 
interaction effect in all the regression analyses – this is done to reduce multicollinearity and 
facilitate the interpretation of the data. The results are shown in Tables 9 to 11.  
According to Table 9, the Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction effect on happiness is 
statistically significant (β = .16, p < .05). In light of this statistically significant interaction effect, 
I conducted a simple slope analysis to further probe the interaction effect. Simple slope analyses 
reveal that at low levels of perceived transgression severity, Forgiven-ness is statistically 
significantly positively related to happiness (simple slope B = .45, Z = 2.80, p < .01); at high 
levels of perceived severity, Forgiven-ness is also significantly positively related to happiness 
(simple slope B = .99, Z = 7.26, p < .01). On closer examination, the results indicate that the 
relationship between Forgiven-ness and happiness is stronger at high levels (as compared to at 
low levels) of perceived transgression severity (i.e., at high levels of perceived severity, B = .99; 
by contrast, at low levels of perceived severity, B = .45). Overall, this pattern of results provides 
support for Hypothesis 4a that perceived mistake/transgression severity accentuates the 
relationship between Forgiven-ness and happiness. This pattern of results is depicted in Figure 5. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 9 about here 
-------------------------------- 
--------------------------------- 




According to Table 9, the Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction effect on gratitude is 
marginally statistically significant (β = .12, p = .06). In light of this marginally significant 
interaction effect, I conducted a simple slope analysis to further probe the interaction effect. 
Simple slope analyses show that at low levels of perceived transgression severity, Forgiven-ness 
is significantly positively related to gratitude (simple slope B = .58, Z = 3.57, p < .01); at high 
levels of transgression severity, Forgiven-ness is also significantly positively related to gratitude 
(simple slope B = .99, Z = 7.11, p < .01). On closer examination, the results indicate that the 
relationship between Forgiven-ness and gratitude is stronger at high levels (as compared to at 
low levels) of perceived transgression severity (i.e., at high levels of perceived severity, B = .99; 
by contrast, at low levels of perceived severity, B = .58). Overall, this pattern of results provides 
support for Hypothesis 5a that perceived mistake severity accentuates the relationship between 
Forgiven-ness and gratitude. This pattern of results in depicted in Figure 6. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 6 about here 
--------------------------------- 
According to Table 10, the Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction effect on guilt is 
statistically significant (β = .14, p < .05). In light of this statistically significant interaction effect, 
I conducted a simple slope analysis to further probe the interaction effect. Simple slope analyses 
show that at low levels of Forgiven-ness, the relationship between perceived transgression 
severity and guilt is statistically non-significant (simple slope B = .22, Z = 1.07, ns); at high 
levels of Forgiven-ness, perceived severity is significantly positively related to guilt (simple 
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slope B = .79, Z = 4.29, p < .01). This pattern of results shows that Hypothesis 3a is not 
supported. Figure 7 depicts this pattern of results. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 10 about here 
-------------------------------- 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 7 about here 
--------------------------------- 
According to Table 10, the Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction effect on shame is 
statistically significant (β = .17, p < .05). In light of this statistically significant interaction effect, 
I conducted a simple slope analysis to further probe the interaction effect. Simple slope analyses 
show that at low levels of Forgiven-ness, the relationship between perceived transgression 
severity and shame is statistically non-significant (simple slope B = .00, Z = .01, ns); at high 
levels of Forgiven-ness, perceived severity is significantly positively related to shame (simple 
slope B = .50, Z = 3.53, p < .01). This pattern of results shows that Hypothesis 2a is not 
supported. This pattern of results is depicted in Figure 8. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 8 about here 
--------------------------------- 
By contrast, Table 11 shows that the Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction effect on fear 
is statistically non-significant (β = .09, ns). Since this interaction effect is non-significant, I then 
examine if the lower-order main effect predictors have any influence on offenders’ experience of 
fear. Regression analysis (see the results in Step 2) shows that perceived transgression severity is 
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positively related to fear (β = .16, p < .05), and that Forgiven-ness is negatively related to fear (β 
= -.14, p < .05). Of interest to my dissertation, perceived severity is positively related with fear, 
but Forgiven-ness does not attenuate the relationship between perceived severity and fear. 
Therefore, hypothesis 1a is not supported; by implication, the mediated moderation hypotheses 
involving fear (i.e., hypotheses 1bi and 1bii) are not supported.   
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 11 about here 
--------------------------------- 
According to Table 11, the Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction effect is statistically 
non-significantly associated with creativity (β = .03, ns). This finding, coupled with the finding 
that the various emotion states (i.e., gratitude, happiness, guilt, shame) are non-significantly 
associated with creativity (please refer to the correlation table), show that all the mediated 
moderation hypotheses – that is, hypotheses 1bii, 2bii, and 4bii – involving the effects of 
perceived transgression severity and Forgiven-ness on creativity are not supported. Since the 
Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction effect on creativity is statistically non-significant, I then 
examine if the corresponding main effect predictors have any influence on creativity. As shown 
in step 2 of the regression analysis, the relationship between perceived transgression severity and 
creativity is statistically non-significant (β = .05, ns), and the relationship between the offenders’ 
Forgiven-ness and their creativity is statistically non-significant (β = -.05, ns). Hence, neither the 
interaction effect nor main effect predictors account for a significant proportion of variance in 
creativity.   
Lastly, Table 11 shows that the Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction effect is statistically 
non-significantly associated with prosocial behavior (β = .01, ns). However, correlation analyses 
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show that the various emotion states (i.e., shame, guilt, happiness, gratitude) are statistically 
significantly correlated with prosocial behavior (please refer to Table 8). In light of this, and 
since mediation can still occur even if the independent variables are non-significantly associated 
with the dependent variables, I proceeded to conduct mediation analysis (Hayes, 2013) for 
prosocial behavior.  
With regard to happiness, mediation analysis (Hayes, 2013) shows the following: First, 
happiness is positively related with prosocial behavior (coefficient = .15, p < .05). Second, at 
high perceived transgression severity level (i.e., +1SD from mean of perceived severity), the 
conditional indirect effect of Forgiven-ness on prosocial behavior through happiness is 
statistically significant (i.e., the confidence interval does not include 0) (conditional indirect 
effect = .15); at low perceived transgression severity level (i.e., -1SD from mean of perceived 
severity), the conditional indirect effect of Forgiven-ness on prosocial behavior through 
happiness is also statistically significant (conditional indirect effect = .07). Hence, mediation 
analysis shows that Forgiven-ness is positively related to offenders’ happiness, which is in turn 
positively related to their prosocial behavior – and this indirect effect is stronger at high levels, 
as compared to at low levels, of perceived transgression severity. Therefore, the pattern of results 
supports Hypothesis 4bi. 
With regard to gratitude, mediation analysis shows the following: First, gratitude is 
positively related with prosocial behavior (coefficient = .15, p < .05). Second, at high perceived 
transgression severity level, the conditional indirect effect of Forgiven-ness on prosocial 
behavior through gratitude is statistically significant (conditional indirect effect = .15); at low 
perceived severity level, this conditional indirect effect is also statistically significant 
(conditional indirect effect = .09). Hence, mediation analysis shows that Forgiven-ness is 
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positively related to offenders’ gratitude, which is in turn positively related to their prosocial 
behavior – and this indirect effect is stronger at high levels, as compared to at low levels, of 
perceived transgression severity. Therefore, the overall pattern of results provides support for 
Hypothesis 5b. 
With regard to guilt, although the pattern of results do not support Hypothesis 3a (and by 
implication, Hypothesis 3b is not supported), in light of the statistically significant Forgivenness-
by-Severity interaction effect on guilt, I conducted mediation analysis (Hayes, 2013) to examine 
if guilt mediates the relationship between this Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction effect and 
offenders’ prosocial behavior. The mediation analysis shows the following: First, guilt is 
positively related with prosocial behavior (coefficient = .12, p < .05). Second, at high 
Forgivenness level (i.e., +1SD from the mean of Forgiven-ness), the conditional indirect effect of 
perceived transgression severity on prosocial behavior through guilt is statistically significant 
(conditional indirect effect = .09); by contrast, at low Forgiven-ness level (i.e., -1SD from the 
mean of Forgiven-ness), this conditional indirect effect is statistically non-significant (i.e., 
confidence interval includes 0) (conditional indirect effect = .03). Hence, mediation analysis 
shows that only when Forgiven-ness is high, perceived transgression severity is positively related 
to offenders’ guilt, which is in turn positively related to their prosocial behavior. 
With regard to shame, although the pattern of results do not support Hypothesis 2a (and 
by implication, Hypothesis 2bi is not supported), in light of the statistically significant 
Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction effect on shame, I conducted mediation analysis (Hayes, 
2013) to examine if shame mediates the relationship between this Forgivenness-by-Severity 
interaction effect and offenders’ prosocial behavior. The mediation analysis shows the following: 
First, shame is positively related with prosocial behavior (coefficient = .16, p < .05). Second, at 
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high Forgiven-ness level, the conditional indirect effect of perceived transgression severity on 
prosocial behavior through shame is statistically significant (conditional indirect effect = .08); by 
contrast, at low Forgiven-ness level, this conditional indirect effect is statistically non-significant 
(conditional indirect effect = .00). Hence, mediation analysis shows that only at high Forgiven-
ness level, perceived transgression severity is positively related to offenders’ shame, which is in 
turn positively related to their prosocial behavior.  
Harman one-factor model 
Finally, in order to investigate the extent to which common source bias may account for 
all my survey findings, I conducted structural equation modelling (SEM) analysis on all the 
items used in this study to examine if a single factor fitted the data. SEM analysis shows that the 
one-factor model has poor overall model fit (χ2 = 3192.26, df = 882, CFI = .65, TLI = .59, IFI = 
.66, NFI = .58, RMSEA = .12). This result shows that the findings of my study are not solely due 
to common source bias. 
 
ITS Discussion 
The pattern of results in my interpersonal transgression survey (ITS) provides support for 
the hypotheses with regard to the human flourishing emotions of happiness and gratitude. In 
essence, the results show that perceived transgression/hurt severity accentuates the positive 
relationships between the extent to which offenders have been forgiven (i.e., Forgiven-ness) and 
their feelings of happiness and gratitude, such that when offenders are forgiven for severe 
transgressions (as compared to that of slight transgressions), they feel even more gratitude and 
happiness. Furthermore, this study shows that through its influence on offenders’ gratitude and 
happiness, the joint effects of perceived transgression severity and Forgiven-ness indirectly 
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increases offenders’ prosocial behavior. In sum, offenders’ experience of forgiveness for their 
interpersonal transgressions is associated with behavioral/social- and emotion-based human 
flourishing outcomes. 
However, the ITS survey data does not support the hypotheses with regard to the guilt 
and shame emotions. Although the Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction effect is statistically 
significantly related to guilt and shame, the pattern of relationships is somewhat unexpected. 
Specifically, analyses show that for offenders who experience high levels of Forgiven-ness for 
their transgressions, perceived transgression severity is significantly positively related to their 
feelings of guilt and shame; by contrast, for offenders who experience low levels of 
Forgivenness for their transgressions, perceived transgression severity is non-significantly 
associated with offenders’ feelings of guilt and shame.  
Hence, the patterns of results for the guilt and shame emotions do not support my 
hypotheses and story; rather they suggest an emotional moral barometer (Tangney et al., 2007) 
sensitivity story. First, at high Forgiven-ness level (for example, when offenders have been 
forgiven for their interpersonal transgressions), a ‘reflected conscience’ or ‘reflected 
virtuousness’ phenomenon may be operating – in the sense that when offenders see and 
experience their victims’ virtuousness (as their victims have forgiven them even though they had 
transgressed against their victims), the offenders may more clearly perceive the extent of their 
guilt and unworthiness – that is, they can with greater sensitivity experience guilt and shame at 
levels that are commensurate with the extent of hurt that they had inflicted on their victims. 
Moreover, when offenders are forgiven, it may free them to get in touch with their hearts and 
conscience – so that they experience the self-conscious moral emotions of guilt and shame at 
levels that are commensurate with the severity of hurt that they had inflicted on their victims. 
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However, at low Forgiven-ness level (for example, when offenders have not been 
forgiven for their transgressions), the ‘reflected conscience’ or ‘reflected virtuousness’ 
phenomenon may not be operating; moreover, when offenders are unforgiven, their defense 
mechanism may be activated so that they do not get in touch with their hearts and conscience, 
and numb themselves from being sensitive to the moral emotions of guilt and shame – thus the 
extent to which they experience the moral emotions of guilt and shame is not commensurate with 
the severity of hurt that they had inflicted on their victims. 
In sum, this emotional moral barometer sensitivity explanation may account for why at 
high Forgiven-ness level, there is a positive relationship between offenders’ perception of 
transgression severity and their feelings of guilt and shame, whereas at low Forgiven-ness level, 
offenders’ perceived transgression severity is non-significantly associated with their feelings of 
guilt and shame. Indeed, the results from my survey suggest that while not being forgiven for 
transgressions is associated with a sense of emotional moral numbing within offenders, 
experiencing forgiveness for transgressions is associated with emotional moral barometer 
sensitivity (Tangney et al., 2007) within offenders in the sense that the offenders feel shame and 
guilt at levels that are commensurate with the amount of hurt that they had inflicted on their 
victims – this emotional moral barometer sensitivity may indeed be a form of optimal human 
functioning. A more direct empirical test should be conducted to further examine the validity of 
this post-hoc explanation. 
Hence, this study underscores the importance of forgiveness for offenders as it has 
implications for the sensitivity of their emotional moral barometer. Further to that, as (moral) 
emotions may precede (moral) cognition, the experience of moral emotions (e.g., guilt, shame, 
gratitude) – and the sensitivity to which offenders feel these moral emotions (McCullough et al., 
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2001; Tangney et al., 2007) – may influence the offenders’ moral sensitivity (which refers to 
“one’s awareness of how one’s actions affect others” (You, Maeda, & Bebeau, 2011, p. 265) 
(Rest, 1984; Zajonc, 1980). In the long run, these may in turn have implications for the moral 
development of the offenders (Gassin, 1998; Murphy & Hampton, 1988). This line of reasoning 
is pertinent to extant discussion of how the experience of forgiveness has implications for the 
moral development of offenders (Gassin, 1998; Murphy & Hampton, 1988). 
Furthermore, this study shows that through its influence on offenders’ guilt and shame, 
the joint effects of perceived transgression severity and Forgiven-ness indirectly increases 
offenders’ prosocial behavior. Indeed, that shame is positively related to the offenders’ prosocial 
behavior contradicts Hypothesis 2bi (which posited that shame will be negatively related to 
offenders’ prosocial behavior). A plausible explanation for the surprising finding that shame is 
positively related to the offender’s prosocial behavior is: when offenders experience shame, they 
feel a low sense of self-worth, hence they may engage in prosocial behavior in order to increase 
their sense of self-worth or salvage their damaged ego (Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009) – that 
is, by doing something good (e.g., helping someone), offenders may counter the decrement in 
their sense of self-worth/self-esteem and thereby reduce their feeling of shame. Indeed, this 
shame-reduction explanation resonates with the guilt-reduction hypothesis as an account for 
prosocial/helping behavior in the social psychology literature – which posited that individuals 
who are feeling guilty may help others in order to reduce their feelings of guilt (Regan 1971; 
Regan et al., 1972). In other words, it is plausible that offenders who experience shame after 
committing a transgression (a negative moral action) may engage in prosocial behavior (a 
positive moral action) in order to alleviate their feeling of shame. This post-hoc explanation may 
thus account for why shame, similar to guilt, is positively related to offenders’ prosocial 
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behavior. Future research is needed to more rigorously examine the validity of this post-hoc 
explanation. 
 The analysis also shows that the Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction effect is non-
significantly associated with the fear emotion; however, the perceived transgression severity 
main effect is significantly positively related to fear. This pattern of results implies that whether 
offenders have been forgiven for their transgressions or not, perceived transgression severity is 
still positively related to fear. Thus, the hypothesis that Forgiven-ness attenuates the positive 
relationship between offenders’ perceived mistake severity and fear is not supported in my ITS 
study.  
In addition, regression analysis shows that the perceived transgression severity and 
Forgiven-ness main effects, as well as their interaction effect are non-significantly related to 
offenders’ creativity. Hence, neither the severity of offenders’ transgressions nor the extent to 
which offenders have been forgiven for their transgression has any implication on their 
creativity.  
Lastly, the effect of offenders’ forgiveness experience does not merely stop at the 
activation of their emotions – these emotion states in turn influence their prosocial behavior. 
Indeed, the analyses show that offenders’ happiness, gratitude, guilt, and shame are all positively 
related to their prosocial behavior. In other words, through the effects on offenders’ emotions 
(i.e., shame, guilt, gratitude, and happiness), the experience of forgiveness (or more specifically, 
the joint influence of offenders’ perception of transgression severity and of the extent to which 
their victims have forgiven them) indirectly increase their prosocial behavior.  
Overall, this study shows that offenders’ experience of being-forgiven for their 
interpersonal transgressions is associated with emotion-based and behavioral/social-based human 
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flourishing or optimal human functioning outcomes (i.e., gratitude, happiness, sensitive 
emotional moral barometer, and prosocial behavior). 
One of the limitations of this study is that it is based on the retrospective survey 
methodology. Yet, this method has been used in existing Being-Forgiven research (e.g., Exline et 
al., 2008; Gassin, 1998; Wallace et al., 2008); moreover, at a broader level, this retrospective 
methodology is a widely used methodology in forgiveness research – whether the study pertains 
to the victims’ or the offenders’ perspective of forgiveness (Fehr et al., 2010; Finkel et al., 2002). 
Indeed, some researchers have even noted that using the retrospective survey methodology may 
be expedient for forgiveness research (as compared to the other methodologies in our field – for 
example, the experimental methodology) since forgiveness research generally involves asking 
research participants about hurt- or harm-related events that they had committed (e.g., 
transgressions, mistakes), and such events will be difficult to simulate in the experimental 
laboratory without compromising on the realism while at the same time abiding by the ethical 
research principles. For example, Wallace et al. (2008) comments, “ taking an experimental 
approach to systematically study how transgressors behave toward forgiving and unforgiving 
individuals is difficult because the requisite transgression cannot be ethically induced or 
simulated without sacrificing some ecological validity” (p. 455). Hence, when the advantages 
and disadvantages of the retrospective survey methodology have been weighed (as well as how 
this methodology compares with other methodologies in our field), this methodology may be the 
most suitable methodology for the topic of forgiveness within the context of transgressions – due 
to this topic’s sensitive nature. 
Another limitation of this study is that the responses to the survey are all self-reported 
(i.e., common source bias). Yet, the Harman one-factor SEM analysis on all the items used in the 
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survey shows that the one-factor model had poor overall model fit. This shows that the findings 
of my survey are not solely due to common source bias. Moreover, the statistically significant 
interaction effects in my survey buttress my argument that the findings in this survey study are 




My dissertation focuses on the experience of forgiveness from the perspective of the 
people who commit mistakes, errors, or transgressions. As with the few research pioneers who 
have investigated forgiveness from the offenders’ perspective, I investigated how offenders’ 
experience of being forgiven for their mistakes (i.e., errors and transgressions) may lead to a 
reduction in their negative emotions. Of greater importance, in my dissertation, I further 
examined the question of whether offenders’ experience of being forgiven for their mistakes may 
also lead them to experience human flourishing outcomes; in addition, I examined if the 
offenders’ state emotions may be a mediating mechanism that underlies the relationship between 
their experience of forgiveness and some of these human flourishing outcomes.  
To recapitulate, I examined three aspects of human flourishing as possible outcomes for 
offenders’ being-forgiven experience – happiness and gratitude as emotional aspects of human 
flourishing, creativity as a cognitive aspect of human flourishing, and prosocial behavior as a 
behavioral/social aspect of human flourishing.  In general, for the human flourishing emotions of 
happiness and gratitude, the basic rationale is that offenders’ perception of the extent to which 
they have been forgiven for their mistakes is positively related to their feelings of happiness and 
gratitude; and the perceived severity of the mistake will accentuate the positive relationship 
between Forgiven-ness and these human flourishing emotions. On the other hand, for the 
negative emotions, the basic rationale is that offenders’ perception of mistake severity is 
positively related to their feelings of fear, shame, and guilt; and offenders’ perception of the 
extent to which they have been forgiven will attenuate the positive relationship between 
perceived mistake severity and these negative emotions. I further hypothesized that through these 
positive and negative emotion states, perceived mistake severity and the extent to which 
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offenders have been forgiven will jointly influence (i.e., interaction effect in this case) their 
creativity and prosocial behavior.   
A survey and an experiment were conducted to test my hypotheses. A distinction between 
the survey and experiment is highlighted here. Specifically, while the theme of the survey was on 
interpersonal transgressions, the theme of the experiment was on work errors. This distinction 
further informs my inferences as I examine the findings across the interpersonal transgression 
survey (ITS) and data entry error (DEE) experiment. 
 
Lessons from the two empirical studies in my dissertation 
Fear 
In my data entry error (DEE) experiment, analysis shows that the Forgivenness-by-
Severity interaction effect is statistically significantly related with the offenders’ feeling of fear, 
such that while the relationship between perceived error severity and fear is statistically non-
significant in the Forgiven treatment condition, this relationship is statistically significant in the 
Unforgiven and Control treatment conditions. Therefore, my experiment results provide support 
for the hypothesis that Being-Forgiven attenuates the positive relationship between offenders’ 
perceived mistake severity and fear. Specifically, the results show that when offenders have been 
forgiven for their errors, it does not matter how big or small their error is on their feeling of fear 
since the debt that has arisen from the errors has been cancelled and no retaliation is forthcoming 
from their victims.   
By contrast, the Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction effect is statistically non-
significantly related to offenders’ feeling of fear in my interpersonal transgression survey (ITS). 
So a pertinent question is: why did this result, which is contrary to my hypothesis, occur? Yet, in 
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comparing between the findings in my survey and experiment, given that the perceived 
transgression severity main effect is significantly positively related with fear in the survey, the 
more precise question is: why is the perceived severity—fear relationship not attenuated when 
there is a high level of Forgiven-ness in my survey? One plausible explanation for this 
unexpected finding is that for offenders who have committed interpersonal transgressions, even 
if they have been forgiven by their victims, they may fear retribution or punishment from higher 
sources (Krause & Ellison, 2003) – this may be a reason that the relationship between perceived 
transgression severity and offenders’ feeling of fear is not attenuated when there is a high level 
of Forgiven-ness experience from their victims. Indeed, this explanation is especially likely 
within the context of my survey since interpersonal transgressions typically involve the issue of 
ethics, and subjects may also have a just-world belief (Lerner, 1978). This explanation may 
account for the difference in findings in my experiment and survey; yet, future empirical studies 
are needed to provide a rigorous test of this post-hoc explanation. 
 
Guilt and shame 
My ITS study reveals that the Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction effect is statistically 
significantly related with offenders’ feelings of guilt and shame – however, the patterns of 
interaction effect run contrary to what I had hypothesized. On the other hand, my DEE 
experiment study shows that the Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction effect is non-significantly 
related with offenders’ feelings of guilt and shame. Yet, the results of both my survey and 
experiment studies converge to show that offenders’ experience of being forgiven for their 
mistakes does not attenuate the relationship between perceived mistake severity and their 
feelings of guilt and shame.  
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Indeed, contrary to my hypotheses, my ITS study shows that at high level of 
Forgivenness, the positive relationships between perceived transgression severity and offenders’ 
feelings of guilt and shame are statistically significant; however, at low level of Forgiven-ness, 
the relationships between perceived transgression severity and offenders’ feelings of guilt and 
shame are statistically non-significant. Respectively, this suggests that at high level of Forgiven-
ness (e.g., when offenders have been forgiven for the transgression), offenders seem to be freed 
to be more sensitive or to be in tune with their conscience, and thus experience guilt and shame 
at levels that are commensurate with the amount of hurt/harm that they had inflicted on their 
victims. By contrast, at low level of Forgiven-ness (e.g., when offenders are not forgiven), 
offenders may not experience this freedom – indeed, the offenders’ defense mechanism may be 
triggered such that they experience numbness with regard to these moral emotions, and thus the 
amount of guilt and shame that they feel are not commensurate with their perception of 
transgression severity. (For example, offenders’ defense mechanism may be activated in order to 
protect their sense of self-worth when they are not forgiven, thus producing a numbing effect 
such that the relationship between their perception of transgression severity and feeling of shame 
is statistically non-significant at low level of Forgiven-ness). 
For my DEE experiment, the main effects of perceived error severity on offenders’ guilt 
and shame are statistically significant in the Forgiven treatment group. This resonates with the 
results in my ITS study, which demonstrate a positive relationship between perceived 
transgression severity with offenders’ guilt and shame at high level of Forgiven-ness. However, 
the statistically non-significant Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction effect on guilt in my DEE 
experiment implies that the perceived error severity—guilt slopes in the Unforgiven and Control 
treatment conditions do not differ significantly from that of the Forgiven treatment condition; 
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likewise, the statistically non-significant Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction effect on shame in 
my experiment implies that the difference in the perceived error severity—shame slopes between 
the Forgiven treatment condition and the Unforgiven or Control treatment conditions are 
statistically non-significant. Hence, the pertinent question is: why, unlike the results that are 
obtained in the interpersonal transgression survey, is the effect of perceived error severity on 
guilt and shame not attenuated in the not-forgiven conditions (i.e., the control and unforgiven 
conditions) in my experiment? One plausible reason for this is that the defense mechanism that 
produces the numbing effect is not operating in the not-forgiven conditions in my experiment. 
This reason is especially plausible since my experiment involves subjects being led to believe 
that they had committed accidental typo errors – and because of their accidental or non-
intentional nature, such work errors typically do not involve the issue of ethics. In other words, I 
posit that the offenders’ defense mechanisms operate to numb them from being sensitive to the 
moral emotions of shame and guilt only when the issue of ethics is involved – for example, 
within the context of my survey which pertains to interpersonal transgressions. By contrast, 
offenders’ defense mechanisms may not have been activated when the notion of ethics is not 
involved – for example, within the context of my DEE experiment where subjects were led to 
believe that they had committed accidental work errors. Indeed, supplementary analysis, which 
are conducted only for suggestive purpose, shows that the subjects perceived a greater level of 
responsibility for their mistakes in the survey involving interpersonal transgressions (M = 3.69, 
SD = .85, n = 187) than in the experiment involving accidental work errors (M = 3.48, SD = 1.02, 
n = 84), t(269) = -1.81, p = .07 (marginally significant). Rigorous tests on this post-hoc 




Happiness and gratitude 
My ITS survey results show that the interaction effect between offenders’ perception of 
transgression severity and of the extent to which they have been forgiven (i.e., Forgivenness-by-
Severity interaction effect) is statistically significantly related to their feelings of happiness and 
gratitude, such that perceived transgression severity accentuates the positive relationship 
between offenders’ Forgiven-ness and their feelings of happiness and gratitude. Therefore, the 
results of my interpersonal transgression survey provide support for the human flourishing story 
with regard to the happiness and gratitude emotions. 
By contrast, my data entry error experiment shows that the Forgivenness-by-Severity 
interaction effect is non-significantly related to offenders’ feelings of happiness and gratitude; 
furthermore, contrary to my argument, the Forgiven-ness main effect on happiness and gratitude 
are statistically non-significant. That even the Forgiven-ness main effect is non-significantly 
associated with happiness and gratitude suggests that a plausible explanation for this unexpected 
finding is that the offender-subjects may not value the forgiveness in the experiment. For 
example, it is plausible that subjects do not value the forgiveness because they may rationalize 
that they had “committed” only accidental typo mistakes and everyone commits typo mistakes 
sometimes, thus they and their actions are not particularly bad in this experiment – therefore, the 
experience of being forgiven for their work errors is not such big a deal that pushes offender-
subjects to a higher emotional platform to experience happiness. It is also plausible that the 
subjects, being strangers with the confederate, do not particularly value the forgiveness from the 
“victim-confederate” and thus do not regard it as such a positive benefit to them that they 
experience happiness. Thus, whether subjects are forgiven or unforgiven for their errors is not 
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related with their feeling of happiness (i.e., Forgiven-ness main effect is non-significantly 
associated with happiness).  
The same line of reasoning applies to the gratitude emotion – that is, because forgiveness 
is not a gift that they value, whether they are forgiven or not forgiven for their work errors is not 
associated with their feeling of gratitude (i.e., Forgiven-ness main effect is non-significantly 
associated with gratitude). Furthermore and of greater interest here, if the subjects do not value 
the forgiveness, it is a moot point as to whether perceived error severity accentuates the 
relationships between offenders’ Forgiven-ness and their feelings of happiness and gratitude –  
this explanation resonates with my experiment findings that the Forgivenness-by-Severity 
interaction effect on offenders’ happiness and gratitude are statistically non-significant. Future 
research may assess the validity of this post-hoc explanation by assessing ‘the extent to which 
offenders value the experience of being forgiven’, and examine this variable as a potential 
moderator of the relationship between the extent to which offenders have been forgiven for their 
mistakes and their feelings of happiness and gratitude. 
Another plausible explanation for the unexpected findings with regard to happiness and 
gratitude in my DEE experiment is: because forgiveness takes place immediately after a serious 
negative event (where subjects were led to believe that they caused a stranger to lose $500 or 
$2000), the subjects’ emotions could not change gears fast enough – so while subjects may 
experience a reduction in negative emotion states, they could not “attain the higher platform” of 
experiencing the positive emotions states of happiness and gratitude. Future research is needed to 






In the survey and experiment, analyses show that both the main effects of perceived 
mistake severity and the extent to which offenders have been forgiven for their mistakes, as well 
as the Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction effect do not account for any variance in the 
offenders’ creativity scores. Thus, the two studies in my dissertation converge to show that 
neither the perceived severity of mistake nor the offenders’ experience of being forgiven for their 
mistakes has any implication on their creativity. 
 
Prosocial behavior 
Although the regression of prosocial behavior on Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction 
effect is statistically significant in my data entry error experiment, the pattern of results is not 
consistent with a human flourishing story (rather, the pattern of results suggests a psychological 
closure or equilibrium story). That is, my experiment shows that offenders’ experience of 
forgiveness does not lead them to have enhanced prosocial behavior. By contrast, my 
interpersonal transgression survey shows that through the effects on offenders’ emotions (i.e., 
gratitude, happiness, shame, and guilt), the experience of forgiveness (or more specifically, the 
joint influence of offenders’ perception of transgression severity and of the extent to which their 
victims have forgiven them) indirectly increases their prosocial behavior. The difference in 
findings on prosocial behavior between my DEE experiment and ITS survey may be due to the 
differential activation of the offenders’ emotion states – that is, while the Forgivenness-by-
Severity interaction effect influences the offenders’ guilt, shame, gratitude, and happiness within 
the context of interpersonal transgressions, this interaction effect does not influence these 
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offender emotion states within the context of work errors. Future research is needed to more 
rigorously examine this post-hoc explanation. 
 
Overall 
Overall, there are both similarities and differences in the findings across my ITS survey 
and DEE experiment. In terms of similarity, the two studies converge to show that offenders’ 
experience of being forgiven for their work errors and interpersonal transgressions are not 
associated with enhanced creativity (cognitive aspect of human flourishing). In terms of 
differences, at a general level, while offenders’ experience of being forgiven for unintentional 
work errors does not tell a human flourishing story at all, their experience of being forgiven for 
interpersonal transgressions tells a human flourishing story – albeit limited only to the emotional 
and behavioral/social aspects of human flourishing or optimal human functioning. 
At this juncture, I would like to note a caveat – my two studies differ not only in terms of 
the types of mistakes (i.e., unintentional work errors versus interpersonal transgressions), but 
also in terms of the research methodologies (i.e., an experiment and a survey). While it is more 
plausible that the type of mistakes, rather than the type of research methodology, has yielded the 
differential results – that is, it is more plausible and intuitively appealing to infer that ‘being 
forgiven for interpersonal transgressions is associated with social- and emotion-based human 
flourishing, but being forgiven for work errors is not associated with social- and emotion-based 
human flourishing’, rather than ‘being forgiven as assessed by a survey methodology is 
associated with social- and emotion-based human flourishing, but being forgiven as assessed by 
an experiment methodology is not associated with social- and emotion-based human flourishing’ 
– further research is needed to validate this plausible suggestion. Indeed, it may be particularly 
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informative if future research investigate the effect of being forgiven for interpersonal 
transgressions using an experiment methodology, and the effect of being forgiven for work errors 
using a survey methodology – if these lines of investigation triangulate on the conclusions, then 
our confidence in the conclusions will be strengthened.  
Contributions 
To truly understand the experience of forgiveness, we need research from the 
perspectives of both the victims and the offenders. However, much of existing research has 
examined the topic of forgiveness from the perspective of the victims only; there’s a scarcity of 
research that examines forgiveness from the perspective of the offenders. Hence, my dissertation 
seeks to fill this important gap and contributes to the corpus of forgiveness literature by 
examining the experience and consequences of forgiveness from the offenders’ perspective. 
Forgiveness is relevant against a backdrop of mistakes. Within the context of mistakes, 
offenders typically experience negative outcomes when they commit mistakes – for example, 
they may experience guilt and fear. Hence, in my dissertation, I investigated whether and how 
offenders’ experience of being forgiven for their mistakes may lead to a reduction in some of 
their negative outcomes; furthermore, I examined if offenders’ experience of forgiveness may 
also lead them to experience positive outcomes (e.g., human flourishing/optimal human 
functioning outcomes). Since there is a dearth of research especially on the issue of whether 
offenders’ experience of forgiveness for mistakes is associated with positive outcomes, this is 
another contribution of my dissertation.  
My proposed framework was tested on two types of mistakes – interpersonal 
transgressions and unintentional work errors. Results of my empirical studies suggest that 
offenders’ experiences of forgiveness for these two types of mistakes do not tell the same story. 
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Specifically, while the experience of being forgiven for interpersonal transgressions tells an 
emotion-based and behavioral/social-based human flourishing story, the experience of being 
forgiven for unintentional work errors does not tell a human flourishing story at all. Hence, my 
dissertation reveals some differences between offenders’ experience of forgiveness for 
interpersonal transgressions versus their experience of forgiveness for unintentional work errors 
– another contribution to the literature. 
Boundary Condition and Future Research 
While examining the experience of forgiveness from the offenders’ perspective is my 
major contribution to the literature, it is simultaneously a boundary condition in my dissertation. 
Indeed, my paper, like the bulk of extant forgiveness research, examines forgiveness from the 
perspective of only one party – the offenders’ or the victims’. 
Future research may thus push the frontiers of forgiveness research by examining 
forgiveness experiences within the offender-victim dyad – for example, by examining the 
dynamic forgiveness-related interactions between the offenders and victims. This will enrich our 
understanding of the forgiveness phenomenon.  Furthermore, more empirical research may be 
conducted on the forgiveness phenomenon at higher levels-of-analysis – while some conceptual 
work has been done in this aspect (Fehr & Gelfand, 2012; Palanski, 2012), empirical work has 
yet to catch up. 
The results of my two studies suggest that the type of mistakes (i.e., unintentional errors 
versus interpersonal transgressions) may affect the pattern of emotional and behavioral outcomes 
when offenders experience forgiveness from their victims. This would indeed be a fruitful 
avenue for future research. Specifically, future research may more rigorously examine if the type 
of mistakes (and the notion of ethicality) may be a third-order moderator of the 2-way 
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Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction effect on the offenders’ emotion states and behavioral 
outcomes. In addition, as noted earlier, future research may examine if the ‘extent to which 
offenders value the forgiveness from their victims’ may affect their emotional and behavioral 
consequences of experiencing forgiveness for their mistakes. Other suggestions for future 
research have been noted elsewhere in my Discussion section. 
Workplace Implications 
The topic of forgiveness is important in the workplace as mistakes, errors, and 
transgressions occur (e.g., unfairness, trust violation, errors – Berlinger, 2005; Greenberg, 2006; 
Hershcovis, & Barling, 2010; Lewicki, 1983; Robinson & Bennett, 1995; Tepper, 2007; van 
Dyck, Frese, Baer, & Sonnentag, 2005; Zhao & Olivera, 2006). Indeed, at some point in their 
jobs, all employees will commit mistakes. Yet, after committing the mistakes, it is important that 
the focal employees not be handicapped by their mistakes (Arendt, 1958) and are able to move 
on as they still need to work, and work together with other employees. This underscores the 
importance of forgiveness at the workplace as it has important implications for the offender-
employees, their victims, as well as their interpersonal relationships with their victims. 
Applied to the workplace, the results of my ITS study recommend that managers forgive 
their subordinates for interpersonal transgressions, as doing so may allow their subordinates to 
experience the human flourishing emotions of happiness and gratitude. Moreover, forgiving 
subordinates for interpersonal transgressions may free them to get in touch with their moral self-
conscious emotions (e.g., guilt, shame), and enhance the sensitivity of their emotional moral 
barometer – which may plausibly have implications for their moral development, and thus 
prevent them from committing interpersonal transgressions or workplace deviant behaviors in 
the future. Furthermore, in practical terms, this study shows that, through its effects on 
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subordinates’ emotions (gratitude, happiness, shame, and guilt), the experience of forgiveness for 
their interpersonal transgressions may be associated with subordinates performing more 
organizational citizenship behavior. These employee behavioral responses will in turn have 
beneficial implications for the organization’s productivity. 
By contrast, the results of my experiment suggest that when managers forgive their 
subordinates for unintended work errors, they may become less prosocial and engage in less 
organizational citizenship behavior (OCB). Thus, from the manager’s standpoint, it may not be 
particularly productive to convey the message of forgiveness to subordinates when they commit 
work errors as doing so may lead to a reduction in subordinates’ OCB.  
And yet, OCB is not the only work-related criterion that managers care about (e.g., other 
work-related criteria that are of interest to managers include subordinates’ task performance, 
learning). Thus, more research should be conducted to investigate if subordinates’ experience of 
forgiveness for their work errors and transgressions could influence other workplace outcomes 
(for example, subordinates’ task performance, learning; Carmeli & Gittell, 2009) before we can 
make good recommendations to managers on the course of action to take when subordinates 
commit mistakes (i.e., transgressions, errors) in the workplace.  
 
Conclusion 
Within the context of interpersonal transgressions, the results of my survey reveal that 
offenders’ perception of forgiveness for their interpersonal transgressions is associated with their 
feelings of happiness and gratitude; furthermore, when offenders have been forgiven for severe 
transgressions (as compared to that of slight transgressions), they feel even more happiness and 
gratitude. This pattern of findings resonates with an emotion-based human flourishing story. 
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In addition, my survey shows that when offenders perceive a low level of forgiveness for 
their interpersonal transgressions, the severity of their transgressions is non-significantly related 
to their feelings of guilt and shame; however, when offenders perceive a high level of 
forgiveness for their interpersonal transgressions, they have an increased sensitivity to the moral 
emotions of guilt and shame, such that they feel guilt and shame at levels that are commensurate 
with their perception of transgression severity. The former result suggests that when offenders do 
not receive forgiveness from their victims, they may experience a sense of emotional moral 
numbing; the latter result suggests that when offenders are forgiven for their interpersonal 
transgressions, they will have a more sensitive emotional moral barometer – which may be a 
form of optimal human functioning. Hence, my study underscores the importance of forgiveness 
as it yields within offenders a sensitive emotional moral barometer – with plausible implications 
for their moral sensitivity and moral development. 
Furthermore, through the effects on their emotions (i.e., gratitude, happiness, shame, and 
guilt), offenders’ experience of forgiveness for interpersonal transgressions (or more precisely 
stated, the joint influence of offenders’ perception of transgression severity and of the extent to 
which they have been forgiven by their victims) indirectly increase their prosocial behavior. 
Hence, my survey shows that offenders’ experience of being-forgiven for their interpersonal 
transgressions is associated with emotion-based and behavioral/social-based human flourishing 
or optimal human functioning outcomes. 
 Within the context of unintended work errors, the pattern of findings in my Data Entry 
Error experiment shows that even though offenders’ experience of being forgiven for their errors 
removes the effect of perceived error severity on fear, it does not lead to any human flourishing 
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outcomes. Hence, offenders’ experience of being forgiven for unintended work errors does not 
tell a human flourishing story. 
 In conclusion, my dissertation shows that offenders’ experience of being forgiven for 
their work errors is not associated with any human flourishing outcomes; by contrast, offenders’ 
experience of being forgiven for interpersonal transgressions is associated with emotion-based 





In order to examine whether the DEE experiment data will be different for believed vs. 
suspected subjects, I conducted a 3rd-order interaction effect regression analysis (i.e., with the 
believed-vs-suspected variable as a third independent variable in the regression analysis). And 
the regression analysis shows that this Forgivenness-by-Severity-by-Suspect 3rd-order interaction 
effect is statistically significant for the happiness and gratitude emotion states – this shows that 
the subjects who suspected the experimental manipulation has different gratitude and happiness 
data patterns from the subjects who believed the experimental manipulation.  
Also, although the Forgivenness-by-Severity-by-Suspect 3rd-order interaction effect is 
statistically non-significant for fear and prosocial behavior, the originally statistically significant 
2nd-order Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction effects on fear and prosocial behavior (which had 
been obtained for the purely-believed subjects) are now statistically non-significant when the 
suspected subjects are included in the analysis.  
Overall, the analyses (on the believed-vs-suspected subjects) show that the data pattern 
and psychological mechanism are different for the subjects who believed the experimental 
manipulation versus those who suspected the experimental manipulation. Hence, I conducted 






Aquino, K., Tripp, T. M., & Bies, R. J. (2006). Getting even or moving on? Power, procedural 
justice, and types of offense as predictors of revenge, forgiveness, reconciliation, and avoidance 
in organizations. Journal of Applied Psychology, 91, 653–668. 
 
Ashby, Jr., H. U. (2003). Being forgiven: Toward a thicker description of forgiveness. Journal of 
Pastoral Care & Counseling, 57, 143-152. 
 
Baas, M., De Dreu, C. K. W., & Nijstad, B. A. (2008). A meta-analysis of 25 years of mood-
creativity research: Hedonic tone, activation, or regulatory focus? Psychological Bulletin, 134, 
779-806. 
 
Bartlett, M. Y., & DeSteno, D. (2006). Gratitude and prosocial behavior: Helping when it costs 
you. Psychological Science, 17, 319-325. 
Baumeister, R. F., Reis, H. T., & Delespaul, P. A. E. G. (1995). Subjective and experiential 
correlates of guilt in daily life. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21, 1256-1268. 
Baumeister, R. F., Stillwell, A. M., & Heatherton, T. F. (1994). Guilt: An interpersonal 
approach. Psychological Bulletin, 115, 243-267. 
Berlinger, N. (2005). After harm: Medical error and the ethics of forgiveness. Baltimore, MD: 
John Hopkins University Press.  
 
Bradfield, M., & Aquino, K. (1999). The effects of blame attributions and offender likableness 
on forgiveness and revenge in the workplace. Journal of Management, 25, 607–631. 
 
Carlson, M., Charlin, V., & Miller, N. (1988). Positive mood and helping behavior: A test of six 
hypotheses. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 211-229. 
Carmeli, A., & Gittell, J. H. (2009). High-quality relationships, psychological safety, and 
learning from failures in work organizations. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 30, 709-729. 
 
Carver, C. S., & White,T. L. (1994). Behavioral inhibition, behavioral activation, and affective 
responses to impending reward and punishment: The BIS/BAS scales. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 67, 319-333. 
Chan, M. L. E. (2009). “Why did you hurt me?” Victim’s interpersonal betrayal attribution and 
trust implications. Review of General Psychology, 13, 262-274. 
 
Chan, M. L. E., & Arvey, R. D. (2011). The role of forgivingness and anger in unfair events. 




Chan, M. L. E., & McAllister, D. (2014). Abusive supervision through the lens of employee state 
paranoia. Academy of Management Review.  
 
Crossley, C. D. (2009). Emotional and behavioral reactions to social undermining: A closer look 
at perceived offender motives. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 108, 
14-24. 
 
Delbanco, T., & Bell, S. K. (2007). Guilty, afraid, and alone – struggling with medical error. 
New England Journal of Medicine, 357, 1682-1683. 
 
Donnerstein, E., Donnerstein, M., & Munger, G. (1975). Helping behavior as a function of 
pictorially induced moods. Journal of Social Psychology, 97, 221-225. 
 
Eisenberg, N. (1991). Meta-analytic contributions to the literature on prosocial behavior. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 17, 273-282. 
 
Emmons, R. A., & Shelton, C. M. (2005). Gratitude and the science of positive psychology. In C. 
R. Snyder & S. J. Lopez (Eds.), Handbook of positive psychology (pp. 459-471). New York: 
Oxford University Press.   
Enright, R. D. (2001). Forgiveness is a choice: A step-by-step process for resolving anger and 
restoring hope. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.  
 
Enright, R. D., & The Human Development Study Group. (1996). Counseling within the 
forgiveness triad: On forgiving, receiving forgiveness, and self-forgiveness. Counseling and 
Values, 40, 107-126. 
 
Exline, J. J., Baumeister, R. F., Zell, A. L., Kraft, A. J., & Witvliet, C. V. O. (2008). Not so 
innocent: Does seeing one’s own capability for wrongdoing predict forgiveness? Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 94, 495-515. 
 
Exline, J. J., Worthington, Jr., E. L., Hill, P., & McCullough, M. E. (2003). Forgiveness and 
justice: A research agenda for social and personality psychology. Personality and Social 
Psychology Review, 7, 337-348. 
 
Fehr, R., & Gelfand, M. J. (2012). The forgiving organization: A multilevel model of forgiveness 
at work. Academy of Management Review, 37, 664-688. 
 
Fehr, R., Gelfand, M. J., & Nag, M. (2010). The road to forgiveness: A meta-analytic synthesis 
of its situational and dispositional correlates. Psychological Bulletin, 136, 894-914. 
 
Fincham, F. D., & Beach, S. R. (2002). Forgiveness in marriage: Implications for psychological 




Finkel, E. J., Rusbult, C. E., Kumashiro, M., & Hannon, P. A. (2002). Dealing with betrayal in 
close relationships: Does commitment promote forgiveness? Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 82, 956-974. 
 
Fredrickson, B. L. (2001). The role of positive emotions in positive psychology: The broaden-
and-build theory of positive emotions. American Psychologist, 56, 218-226. 
 
Frijda, N. H. (1986). The emotions. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.  
Frijda, N. H., Kuipers, P., & ter Schure, E. (1989). Relations among emotion, appraisal, and 
emotional action readiness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 212-228. 
 
Froh, J. J., Fan, J., Emmons, R. A., Bono, G., Huebner, E. S., & Watkins, P. (2011). Measuring 
gratitude in youth: Assessing the psychometric properties of adult gratitude scales in children 
and adolescents. Psychological Assessment, 23, 311-324. 
Gassin, E. A. (1998). Receiving forgiveness as moral education: A theoretical analysis and initial 
empirical investigation. Journal of Moral Education, 27, 71-87. 
 
Gray, J. A. (1990). Brain systems that mediate both emotion and cognition. Cognition and 
Emotion, 4, 269-288. 
Gray, J. A. (1994). Three fundamental emotion systems. In P. Ekman & R. J. Davidson (Eds.), 
The nature of emotion: Fundamental questions (pp. 243-247). New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Greenberg, J. (2006). Losing sleep over organizational injustice: Attenuating insomniac reactions 
to underpayment inequity with supervisory training in interactional justice. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 91, 58-69. 
 
Guilford, J. P. (1962). Potentiality for creativity. Gifted Child Quarterly, 6, 87-90.  
Hall, J. H., & Fincham, F. D. (2005). Self-forgiveness: The stepchild of forgiveness research. 
Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 24, 621-637. 
 
Hall, J. H., & Fincham, F. D. (2008). The temporal course of self-forgiveness. Journal of Social 
and Clinical Psychology, 27, 174-202. 
 
Hayes, A. F. (2013). Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis: A 
regression-based approach. New York: Guilford Press. 
 





Hershcovis, M. S., & Barling, J. (2010). Towards a multi-foci approach to workplace aggression: 
A meta-analytic review of outcomes from different perpetrators. Journal of Organizational 
Behavior, 31, 24-44. 
 
Isen, A. M. (2000). Positive affect and decision making. In M. Lewis & J. M. Haviland-Jones 
(Eds.), Handbook of emotions (2nd ed., pp. 417-435). New York: Guilford Press.  
Izard, C. E., & Ackerman, B. P. (2000). Motivational, organizational, and regulatory functions of 
discrete emotions. In M. Lewis & J. M. Haviland-Jones (Eds.), Handbook of emotions (2nd ed., 
pp. 253-264). New York: Guilford Press.  
 
Izard, C. E., Libero, D. Z., Putnam, P., & Haynes, O. M. (1993). Stability of emotion experiences 
and their relations to traits of personality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64, 847-
860. 
Karremans, J. C., & van Lange, P. A. M. (2010). The malleability of forgiveness. In M. 
Mikulincer & P. R. Shaver (Eds.), Prosocial motives, emotions, and behavior: The better angels 
of our nature (pp. 285-301). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
 
Kearns, J. N., & Fincham, F. D. (2004). A prototype analysis of forgiveness. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 30, 838-855. 
 
Kelley, D. (1998). The communication of forgiveness. Communication Studies, 49, 255-271. 
 
Kelln, B. R. C., & Ellard, J. H. (1999). An equity theory analysis of the impact of forgiveness 
and retribution on transgressor compliance. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 864-
872. 
 
Kim, S., Thibodeau, R., & Jorgensen, R. S. (2011). Shame, guilt, and depressive symptoms: A 
meta-analytic review. Psychological Bulletin, 137, 68-96. 
 
Kish-Gephart, J. J., Detert, J. R., Trevino, L. K., Edmonson, A. C. (2009). Silenced by fear: The 
nature, sources, and consequences of fear at work. Research in Organizational Behavior, 29, 
163-193. 
Klass, E. T. (1978). Psychological effects of immoral actions: The experimental evidence. 
Psychological Bulletin, 85, 756-771. 
 
Krause, N., & Ellison, C. G. (2003). Forgiveness by God, forgiveness of others, and 
psychological well-being in late life. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 42, 77-93. 
 
Lazarus, R. S. (1991). Progress on a cognitive-motivational-relational theory of emotion. 




Lee, K., & Allen, N. J. (2002). Organizational citizenship behavior and workplace deviance: The 
role of affect and cognitions. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87, 131-142. 
Lerner, M. J., & Miller, D. T. (1978). Just world research and the attribution process: Looking 
back and ahead. Psychological Bulletin, 85, 1030-1051. 
 
Lewicki, R. J. (1983). Lying and deception: A behavioral model. In M. Bazerman & R. J. 
Lewicki (Eds.), Negotiating in organizations (pp. 68–90). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
 
Lewicki, R. J., & Bunker, B. B. (1996). Developing and maintaining trust in work relationships. 
In R. M. Kramer & T. R. Tyler (Eds.), Trust in organizations: Frontiers of theory and research 
(pp. 114–139). Thousan Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Lewis, H. B. (1971). Shame and guilt in neurosis. New York: International Universities Press. 
Lim, S., & Cortina, L. M. (2005). Interpersonal mistreatment in the workplace: The interface and 
impact of general incivility and sexual harassment. Journal of Applied Psychology, 90, 483-496. 
Lyubomirsky, S., King, L., & Diener, E. (2005). The benefits of frequent positive affect: Does 
happiness lead to success? Psychological Bulletin, 131, 803-855. 
Marschall, D., Saftner, J., & Tangney, J. P. (1994). The State Shame and Guilt Scale. Fairfax, 
VA: George Mason University. 
McCullough, M. E., Fincham, F. D., & Tsang, J. A. (2003). Forgiveness, forbearance, and time: 
The temporal unfolding of transgression-related interpersonal motivation. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 84, 540-557. 
 
McCullough, M. E., Kilpatrick, S. D., Emmons, R. A., & Larson, D. B. (2001). Is gratitude a 
moral affect? Psychological Bulletin, 127, 249-266. 
McCullough, M. E., Kimeldorf, M. B., & Cohen, A. D. (2008). An adaptation for altruism? The 
social causes, social effects, and social evolution of gratitude. Current Directions in 
Psychological Science, 17, 281-285. 
McCullough, M. E., Rachal, K. R., Sandage, S. J., Worthington, Jr., E. L., Brown, S. W., & 
Hight, T. L. (1998). Interpersonal forgiveness in close relationships: II. Theoretical elaboration 
and measurement. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 1586-1603.  
 
McCullough, M. E., Worthington, Jr., E. L., & Rachal, K. C. (1997). Interpersonal forgiving in 
close relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 321-336. 
 
McGraw, K. M. (1987). Guilt following transgression: An attribution of responsibility approach. 




McNulty, J. K. (2010). Forgiveness increases the likelihood of subsequent partner transgressions 
in marriage. Journal of Family Psychology, 24, 787-790. 
 
Merolla, A. J. (2008). Communicating forgiveness in friendships and dating relationships. 
Communication Studies, 59, 114-131. 
 
Mullet, E., Girard, M., & Bakhshi, P. (2004). Conceptualizations of forgiveness. European 
Psychologist, 9, 78-86. 
 
Mumford, M. D., & Gustafson, S. B. (1988). Creativity syndrome: Integration, application, and 
innovation. Psychological Bulletin, 103, 27-43. 
 
Murphy, J. G. (2003). Getting even: Forgiveness and its limits. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Murphy, J. G., & Hampton, J. (1988). Forgiveness and mercy. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
North, J. (1987). Wrongdoing and forgiveness. Philosophy, 62, 499-508. 
 
Öhman, A. (2000). Fear and anxiety: Evolutionary, cognitive, and clinical perspectives. In M. 
Lewis & J. M. Haviland-Jones (Eds.), Handbook of emotions (2nd ed., pp. 573-593). New York: 
Guilford Press. 
Orth, U., Berking, M., & Burkhardt, S. (2006). Self-conscious emotions and depression: 
Rumination explains why shame but not guilt is maladaptive. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 32, 1608-1619. 
Palanski, M. E. (2012). Forgiveness and reconciliation in the workplace: A multi-level 
perspective and research agenda. Journal of Business Ethics, 109, 275-287. 
 
Plucker, J. A., & Renzulli, J. S. (1999). Psychometric approaches to the study of human 
creativity. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Handbook of creativity (pp. 35-61). United Kingdom: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Regan, J. W. (1971). Guilt, perceived injustice, and altruistic behavior. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 18, 124-132. 
 
Regan, D. T., Williams, M., & Sparling, S. (1972). Voluntary expiation of guilt: A field 
experiment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 24, 42-45.  
 
Rest, J. R. (1984). The major components of morality. In W. M. Kurtines & J. L. Gewirtz (Eds.), 




Robinson, S., & Bennett, R. (1995). A typology of deviant workplace behaviors: A multi-
dimensional scaling study. Academy of Management Journal, 38, 555-572. 
 
Roseman, I. J. (2008). Motivations and emotivations: Approach, avoidance, and other tendencies 
in motivated and emotional behavior. In A. J. Elliot (Ed.), Handbook of approach and avoidance 
motivation (pp. 343-366). New York: Psychology Press.  
Roseman, I. J., Wiest, C., & Swartz, T. S. (1994). Phenomenology, behaviors and goals 
differentiate discrete emotions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 206-221. 
 
Runco, M. A. (2004). Creativity. Annual Review of Psychology, 55, 657-687. 
 
Rye, M. S., Pargament, K. I., Ali, M. A., Beck, G. L., Dorff, E. N., Hallisey, C., Narayanan, V., 
& Williams, J. G. (2000). Religious perspectives on forgiveness. In M. E. McCullough, K. I. 
Pargament, & C. E. Thoresen (Eds.), Forgiveness: Theory, research, and practice (pp. 17-40). 
New York: Guilford.   
 
Sachdeva, S., Iliev, R., & Medin, D. L. (2009). Sinning saints and saintly sinners: The paradox of 
moral self-regulation. Psychological Science, 20, 523-528.  
 
Shaver, P., Schwartz, J., Kirson, D., & O’Connor, C. (1987). Emotion knowledge: Further 
exploration of a prototype approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 1061-
1086. 
 
Sheikh, S., & Janoff-Bulman, R. (2010). The “shoulds” and “should nots” of moral emotions: A 
self-regulatory perspective on shame and guilt. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36, 
213-224. 
 
Simonton, D. K. (2000). Creativity: Cognitive, personal, developmental, and social aspects. 
American Psychologist, 55, 151-158. 
 
Simonton, D. K. (2005). Creativity. In C. R. Snyder & S. J. Lopez (Eds.), Handbook of positive 
psychology (pp. 189-201). New York: Oxford University Press.   
 
Skitka, L. J., Bauman, C. W., & Mullen, E. (2004). Political tolerance and coming to 
psychological closure following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks: An integrative 
approach. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30, 743-756. 
 
Smedes, L. B. (1996). Forgive & forget: Healing the hurts we don’t deserve. New York: 
HarperOne. 
 




Sternberg, R. J., & Lubart, T. I. (1999). The concept of creativity: Prospects and paradigms. In R. 
J. Sternberg (Ed.), Handbook of creativity (pp. 3-15). United Kingdom: Cambridge University 
Press.  
 
Strelan, P., & Covic, T. (2006). A review of forgiveness process models and a coping framework 
to guide future research. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 25, 1059-1085. 
 
Struthers, C. W., Eaton, J., Shirvani, N., Georghiou, M., & Edell, E. (2008). The effect of 
preemptive forgiveness and a transgressor’s responsibility on shame, motivation to reconcile, 
and repentance. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 30, 130-141. 
 
Tangney, J. P. (1991). Moral affect: The good, the bad and the ugly. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 61, 598-607. 
 
Tangney, J. P., & Dearing, R. L. (2002). Shame and guilt. New York: Guilford Press. 
Tangney, J. P., Stuewig, J., & Mashek, D. J. (2007). Moral emotions and moral behavior. Annual 
Review of Psychology, 58, 345-372.  
Tepper, B. J. (2007). Abusive supervision in work organizations: Review, synthesis, and research 
agenda. Journal of Management, 33, 261-289. 
 
Thompson, W. C., Cowan, C. L., & Rosenhan, D. L. (1980). Focus of attention mediates the 
impact of negative affect on altruism. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 38, 291-
300. 
 
Tsang, J. A. (2006). The effects of helper intention on gratitude and indebtedness. Motivation 
and Emotion, 30, 199-205.  
van Dyck, C., Frese, M., Baer, M., & Sonnentag, S. (2005). Organizational error management 
culture and its impact on performance: A two-study replication. Journal of Applied Psychology, 
90, 1228-1240. 
 
von Dawans, B., Fischbacher, U., Kirschbaum, C., Fehr, E., & Heinrichs, M. (2012). The social 
dimension of stress reactivity: Acute stress increases prosocial behavior in humans. 
Psychological Science, 23, 651-660. 
 
Wallace, H. M., Exline, J. J., & Baumeister, R. F. (2008). Interpersonal consequences of 
forgiveness: Does forgiveness deter or encourage repeat offenses? Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 44, 453-460. 
 
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief measures 
of positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales. Journal of Personality and Social 




Weiss, H. M., & Cropanzano, R. (1996). Affective events theory: A theoretical discussion of the 
structure, causes and consequences of affective experiences at work. Research in Organizational 
Behavior, 18, 1-74. 
 
Wiesenthal, S. (1969). The sunflower: On the possibilities and limits of forgiveness. New York: 
Schocken Books. 
 
Williams, K. D., & Karau, S. J. (1991). Social loafing and social compensation: The effects of 
expectations of co-worker performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61, 570-
581. 
Witvliet, C. V. O., Ludwig, T. E., & Bauer, D. J. (2002). Please forgive me: Transgressors’ 
emotions and physiology during imagery of seeking forgiveness and victim responses. Journal of 
Psychology and Christianity, 21, 219-233. 
 
Worthington, Jr., E. L. (2009). A just forgiveness: Responsible healing without excusing 
injustice. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press. 
 
You, D., Maeda, Y., & Bebeau, M. J. (2011). Gender differences in moral sensitivity: A meta-
analysis. Ethics & Behavior, 21, 263-282.  
 
Zajonc, R. B. (1980). Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences. American 
Psychologist, 35, 151-175. 
 
Zechmeister, J. S., & Romero, C. (2002). Victim and offender accounts of interpersonal conflict: 
Autobiographical narratives of forgiveness and unforgiveness. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 82, 675-686. 
 
Zhao, B. (2011). Learning from errors: The role of context, emotion, and personality. Journal of 
Organizational Behavior, 32, 435-463. 
 
Zhao, B., & Olivera, F. (2006). Error reporting in organizations. Academy of Management 






Table 1 (DEE Experiment). Means, standard deviations, correlations, and internal consistency reliability. 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Dummy1 (control) .34 .48 NA            
2. Dummy2 (unforgiven) .26 .44 -.43** NA           
3. Perceived Severity 4.10 .81 -.16 .17 (.79)          
4. Fear 2.43 1.25 .01 -.04 .39** (.87)         
5. Shame 2.58 1.22 -.03 .06 .36** .81** (.77)        
6. Guilt 3.49 1.57 .02 .03 .46** .66** .71** (.80)       
7. Gratitude 3.25 1.44 -.21 -.02 -.06 .21 .10 -.07 (.92)      
8. Happiness 3.23 1.34 -.14 -.06 -.19 -.01 -.10 -.30** .77** (.88)     
9. Fluency  12.77 5.79 .01 -.11 -.03 .05 -.03 -.03 .04 -.02 (.99)    
10. Flexibility  6.21 1.60 .05 -.12 -.12 .09 .01 -.04 .10 .05 .83** (.83)   
11. Originality .82 1.24 .16 -.02 -.18 -.09 -.10 -.10 .06 -.03 .64** .48** NA  
12. Volunteer project 25.41 26.19 .06 -.18 .13 .15 .23* .16 .04 -.02 -.18 -.07 -.21 NA 
Note: N = 88.  Correlations are based on two-tailed tests. Internal consistency reliabilities are indicated in parentheses (along the diagonal in the 
correlation section).      
* p < .05.   ** p < .01.   
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Table 2 (DEE Experiment). Regression of negative emotion states on Forgiven-ness Treatment Variable and Perceived Severity 
(centered). 
Predictors Fear Shame Guilt 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 
Constant 2.41*** 2.41*** 2.50*** 2.50*** 3.45*** 3.45*** 
Perceived Severity .64*** .25 .55** .26 .93*** .73* 
Dummy1 (control group) .16 .20 .13 .16 .26 .28 
Dummy2 (unforgiven group) -.28 -.45 .05 -.07 -.08 -.18 
Severity*Dummy1 (ctrl) interaction  .65#  .46  .32 
Severity*Dummy2 (uf) interaction  1.10*  .81  .60 
Adjusted R2 .14 .18 .10 .11 .19 .18 
ΔR2 .17** .06* .13* .04 .22*** .01 
F 5.40** 4.69** 3.93* 3.04* 7.25*** 4.51** 
Note: Table shows unstandardized regression coefficients. N = 83. 
* p < .05.   ** p < .01.   *** p < .001.    # p < .06. 
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Table 3 (DEE Experiment). Regression of positive emotion states on Forgiven-ness Treatment Variable and Perceived Severity 
(centered). 
Predictors Gratitude Happiness 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 
Constant 3.65*** 3.65*** 3.50*** 3.50*** 
Perceived Severity -.13 -.37 -.33 -.47 
Dummy1 (control group) -.84* -.82* -.58 -.60 
Dummy2 (unforgiven group) -.53 -.69 -.44 -.68 
Severity*Dummy1 (ctrl) interaction  .33  .05 
Severity*Dummy2 (uf) interaction  .89  1.17# 
Adjusted R2 .03 .03 .04 .06 
ΔR2 .07 .02 .07 .05 
F 1.91 1.54 2.09 2.08 
Note: Table shows unstandardized regression coefficients. N = 83. 




Table 4 (DEE Experiment). Regression of creativity dimensions and prosocial behavior (time offered to volunteer for research project) 
on Forgiven-ness Treatment Variable and Perceived Severity (centered). 
Predictors Fluency 
(n = 83) 
Flexibility 
(n = 80) 
Originality 
(n = 80) 
Prosocial Behav. 
(n = 82) 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 
Constant 13.21*** 13.22*** 6.30*** 6.29*** .53* .53* 26.32*** 26.04*** 
Perceived Severity -.19 -.34 -.22 -.44 -.26 -.19 5.08 -2.44 
Dummy1 (control group) -.43 -.29 .01 .06 .55 .57 2.07 4.01 
Dummy2 (unforgiven group) -1.07 -.51 -.30 -.20 .39 .61 -10.38 -8.89 
Severity*Dummy1 (ctrl) interactn  .96  .59  .12  17.00* 
Severity*Dummy2 (uf) interactn  -2.22  -.16  -1.02  2.44 
Adjusted R2 -.03 -.04 -.02 -.02 .04 .07 .02 .07 
ΔR2 .01 .02 .02 .02 .07 .05 .06 .07# 
F .17 .37 .55 .69 1.98 2.11 1.60 2.26# 
Note: Table shows unstandardized regression coefficients.  
* p < .05.   ** p < .01.   *** p < .001.    # p < .06. 
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Table 5 (DEE Experiment). Regression of Fear and Prosocial Behavior on Forgiven-ness Treatment Variable and Perceived Severity 
(centered).  
Predictors Fear  (n = 83) Prosocial Behav.  (n = 82) 
Constant 2.41*** 26.04*** 
Dummy1 (control group) .20 4.01 
Dummy2 (unforgiven group) -.45 -8.89 
Severity (forgiven group)  .25 -2.44 
Severity (control group) .90*** 14.55** 
Severity (unforgiven group) 1.35** -.00 
Adjusted R2 .18 .07 
ΔR2 .23** .13# 
F 4.69** 2.26# 
Note: Table shows unstandardized regression coefficients. 
* p < .05.   ** p < .01.   *** p < .001.    # p < .06. 
 101 
 
Table 6 (DEE Experiment). Regression of prosocial behavior (time offered to volunteer for research project) on Forgiven-ness 
Treatment Variable and Perceived Severity (centered) – using an alternative dummy coding scheme with Control group as reference 
group. 
Predictors Prosocial Behavior 
Step 1 Step 2 
Constant 28.39*** 30.04*** 
Perceived Severity  5.08 14.55** 
Alternative dummy (forgiven group) -2.07 -4.01 
Alternative dummy (unforgiven group) -12.45 -12.90 
Severity*AltDummy (forgiv) interaction  -17.00* 
Severity*AltDummy (uf) interaction  -14.55 
Adjusted R2 .02 .07 
ΔR2 .06 .07# 
F 1.60 2.26# 
Note: Table shows unstandardized regression coefficients. N = 82. 





Table 7 (DEE Experiment). Test of mediation for the Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction effect on Prosocial Behavior. 
Predictors Prosocial Behavior 
Constant  24.18** 
Perceived Severity -2.64 
Dummy1 (control group) 3.87 
Dummy2 (unforgiven group) -8.43 
Severity*Dummy1 (ctrl) interaction 16.50* 
Severity*Dummy2 (uf) interaction 1.61 
Fear .77 
Adjusted R2 .06 
ΔR2 .13 
F 1.83 
Note: Table shows unstandardized regression coefficients. N = 81. 
* p < .05.   ** p < .01.    
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Table 8 (Interpersonal Transgression Survey – ITS). Means, standard deviations, correlations, and internal consistency reliability. 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Perceived Severity 3.56 .89 (.85)           
2. Forgiven-ness 5.68 1.07 .03 (.95)          
3. Fear 2.03 1.34 .15* -.16* (.89)         
4. Shame 2.43 1.28 .19* -.02 .46** (.70)        
5. Guilt 3.97 1.71 .28** .13 .36** .70** (.82)       
6. Happiness 4.62 1.72 .14 .48** -.20** .00 .08 (.91)      
7. Gratitude 4.72 1.81 .21** .48** -.13 .16* .24** .82** (.94)     
8. Prosocial Behavior 4.44 1.37 .15* .10 .12 .17* .17* .21** .22** (.83)    
9. Creativity (n=99)  3.43 1.52 .14 -.03 .04 -.06 -.01 .13 .06 .48** (.96)   
10. Positive Affectivity 3.17 .60 .19** .03 -.01 .06 .07 .10 .14 .22** .43** (.83)  
11. Negative Affectivity 2.13 .65 -.04 -.11 .15* .15* .11 -.10 -.03 -.05 -.09 .01 (.86) 
Note: N = 187.  Correlations are based on two-tailed tests. Internal consistency reliabilities are indicated in parentheses (along the diagonal in the 
correlation section).      
* p < .05.  ** p < .01. 
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Table 9 (ITS). Regression of gratitude and happiness on perceived transgression/hurt severity 
and Forgiven-ness centered independent variables. 
Predictors Gratitude Happiness 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
Positive Affectivity .14# .09 .10 .10 .07 .07 
Negative Affectivity -.03 .03 .03 -.10 -.05 -.05 
Perceived Severity_c  .18** .17*  .11 .10 
Forgiven-ness_c  .48*** .47***  .47*** .45*** 
Forgivenness*Severity 
interaction_c 
  .12#   .16* 
Adjusted R2 .01 .27 .28 .01 .24 .26 
ΔR2 .02 .26*** .01# .02 .23*** .03* 
F 1.89 17.82*** 15.15*** 1.97 15.36*** 13.98*** 
Note: Table shows standardized regression coefficients. N = 187. 
* p < .05.   ** p < .01.   *** p < .001.    # p ≤ .06.   
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Table 10 (ITS). Regression of guilt and shame on perceived transgression severity and 
Forgivenness centered independent variables. 
Predictors Guilt Shame 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
Positive Affectivity .06 .01 .01 .05 .02 .03 
Negative Affectivity .11 .13# .13# .15* .16* .16* 
Perceived Severity_c  .27*** .26***  .19* .17* 
Forgiven-ness_c  .14# .12  -.01 -.03 
Forgivenness*Severity 
interaction_c 
  .14*   .17* 
Adjusted R2 .01 .09 .11 .02 .04 .06 
ΔR2 .02 .09*** .02* .03 .03* .03* 
F 1.49 5.55*** 5.35*** 2.51 2.93* 3.50** 
Note: Table shows standardized regression coefficients. N = 187. 




Table 11 (ITS). Regression of fear, prosocial behavior, and creativity on perceived transgression 
severity and Forgiven-ness centered independent variables. 
Predictors Fear Prosocial Behavior Creativity (N = 99) 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
Positive Affectivity -.01 -.03 -.03 .22** .20** .20** .43*** .43*** .42*** 
Negative Affectivity .15* .14# .14* -.05 -.03 -.03 -.10 -.10 -.10 
Perceived Severity_c  .16* .15*  .11 .11  .05 .05 
Forgiven-ness_c  -.14* -.15*  .09 .08  -.05 -.05 
Forgivenness*Severity 
interaction_c 
  .09   .01   .03 
Adjusted R2 .01 .05 .05 .04 .05 .04 .18 .17 .16 
ΔR2 .02 .04* .01 .05** .02 .00 .20*** .01 .00 
F 2.18 3.29* 2.94* 4.97** 3.42* 2.72* 11.78*** 5.96*** 4.74** 
Note: Table shows standardized regression coefficients. N = 187 (except creativity where N = 99). 





Supplementary Table 1 (DEE Experiment): Comparison between subjects who believed vs. 
subjects who suspected the experimental manipulations. 
Variable 
 
Subject Type Mean SD t p 
Forgiven-ness 
(manip. check) 
Believed# 3.33 .95 t(169) = -2.14 
 
.03* 
Suspected^ 3.64 .94 
Error Severity 
(manip. check) 
Believed 4.10 .81 t(162) = 3.80 .00*** 
Suspected 3.58 .92 
Guilt  Believed 3.49 1.57 t(171) = 3.63 
 
.00*** 
Suspected 2.71 1.25 
Shame  Believed 2.58 1.22 t(171) = 4.48 
 
.00*** 
Suspected 1.85 .93 
Fear Believed 2.43 1.25 t(171) = 2.47 .02* 
Suspected 2.00 1.08 
Gratitude Believed 3.25 1.44 t(171) = 3.11 .00** 
Suspected 2.60 1.31 
Happiness Believed 3.23 1.34 t(171) = -.01 .99 
Suspected 3.24 1.24 
Volunteer 
research project 
Believed 25.41 26.19 t(170) = .35 .72 
Suspected 23.97 27.49 
Creativity – 
flexibility 
Believed 6.18 1.59 t(171) = -.12 .91 
Suspected 6.21 1.67 
Creativity – 
fluency  
Believed 12.77 5.79 t(171) = -.62 .54 
Suspected 13.37 6.90 





Supplementary Table 2 (DEE Experiment). Regression of gratitude and happiness on 
Forgivenness treatment variable, perceived severity (centered), and subject type (believed vs. 
suspected manipulation). 
Predictors Gratitude Happiness 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
Constant 4.29*** 4.35*** 4.41*** 3.58*** 3.51*** 3.56*** 
Dummy1 (control group) -.83** -.72 -.80 -.60* -.36 -.42 
Dummy2 (unforgiven group) -.39 -.90 -1.45 -.43 -.57 -1.41 
Perceived Severity -.08 -.15 -1.29* -.20 -.42 -1.40* 
Suspect (2 = suspected; 1 = believed) -.66** -.69# -.67# -.03 .04 .06 
Severity*Dummy1(ctrl) interaction  -.22 1.62  -.31 .92 
Severity*Dummy2(uf) interaction  -.01 2.39  -.03 2.97* 
Suspect*Dummy1(ctrl) interaction  -.08 -.11  -.17 -.19 
Suspect*Dummy2(uf) interaction  .35 .54  .11 .44 
Suspect*Severity interaction  .11 .92*  .23 .93* 
Suspect*Dummy1(ctrl)*Severity interaction   -1.30*   -.87 
Suspect*Dummy2(uf)*Severity interaction   -1.50*   -1.81* 
Adjusted R2 .09 .06 .09 .04 .02 .05 
ΔR2 .11** .01 .04* .06* .02 .04* 
F 4.71** 2.19* 2.40** 2.45* 1.37 1.79# 
Note: Table shows unstandardized regression coefficients. N = 160. 
* p < .05.   ** p < .01.   *** p < .001.    # p ≤ .06. 
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Supplementary Table 3 (DEE Experiment). Regression of guilt and shame on Forgiven-ness 
treatment variable, perceived severity (centered), and subject type (believed vs. suspected 
manipulation). 
Predictors Guilt Shame 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
Constant 3.73*** 3.76*** 3.77*** 3.00*** 2.80*** 2.83*** 
Dummy1 (control group) .14 .30 .29 -.02 .25 .21 
Dummy2 (unforgiven group) .14 -.53 -.85 -.04 .02 -.31 
Perceived Severity .61*** 1.38** 1.13 .31** .94** .35 
Suspect (2 = suspected; 1 = believed) -.45* -.51 -.51 -.50** -.41 -.40 
Severity*Dummy1(ctrl) interaction  .26 .46  .19 1.11 
Severity*Dummy2(uf) interaction  .17 1.20  .30 1.65 
Suspect*Dummy1(ctrl) interaction  -.08 -.09  -.16 -.17 
Suspect*Dummy2(uf) interaction  .39 .52  -.08 .04 
Suspect*Severity interaction  -.58* -.40  -.51* -.08 
Suspect*Dummy1(ctrl)*Severity interaction   -.14   -.65 
Suspect*Dummy2(uf)*Severity interaction   -.60   -.84 
Adjusted R2 .17 .18 .17 .12 .13 .13 
ΔR2 .19*** .03 .00 .14*** .04 .02 
F 9.20*** 4.80*** 3.95*** 6.36*** 3.60*** 3.21** 
Note: Table shows unstandardized regression coefficients. N = 160. 
* p < .05.   ** p < .01.   *** p < .001.     
 110 
 
Supplementary Table 4 (DEE Experiment). Regression of fear and prosocial behavior on 
Forgiven-ness treatment variable, perceived severity (centered), and subject type (believed vs. 
suspected manipulation). 
Predictors Fear Prosocial Behavior  
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
Constant 2.42*** 2.61*** 2.64*** 28.38*** 24.46* 24.98* 
Dummy1 (control group) .16 -.15 -.18 -5.78 15.48 14.60 
Dummy2 (unforgiven group) -.17 -.77 -1.27 -5.34 -17.52 -16.28 
Perceived Severity .39*** .95** .36 2.05 4.29 -9.51 
Suspect (2 = suspected; 1 = believed) -.14 -.30 -.29 -1.05 1.33 1.67 
Severity*Dummy1(ctrl) interaction  .43 1.18  8.06 37.30* 
Severity*Dummy2(uf) interaction  .39 2.16*  .44 9.74 
Suspect*Dummy1(ctrl) interaction  .23 .22  -14.50 -14.85 
Suspect*Dummy2(uf) interaction  .35 .54  7.89 6.78 
Suspect*Severity interaction  -.53* -.11  -2.69 7.06 
Suspect*Dummy1(ctrl)*Severity interaction   -.53   -20.30 
Suspect*Dummy2(uf)*Severity interaction   -1.06   -7.29 
Adjusted R2 .09 .11 .12 -.01 .02 .03 
ΔR2 .12** .05 .02 .02 .06 .02 
F 5.08** 3.23** 2.95** .74 1.42 1.49 
Note: Table shows unstandardized regression coefficients. N = 160 (but N = 161 for prosocial behavior). 





Supplementary Table 5 (DEE Experiment). Regression of fluency and flexibility on 
Forgivenness treatment variable, perceived severity (centered), and subject type (believed vs. 
suspected manipulation). 
Predictors Fluency  Flexibility  
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
Constant 11.98*** 13.48*** 13.50*** 6.13*** 7.02*** 7.03*** 
Dummy1 (control group) -.24 -.54 -.61 .17 -.77 -.78 
Dummy2 (unforgiven group) .59 -4.45 -2.67 .29 -1.57 -1.30 
Perceived Severity .34 -1.60 -2.00 -.02 -.79 -.93 
Suspect (2 = suspected; 1 = believed) .68 -.21 -.20 -.06 -.63 -.63 
Severity*Dummy1(ctrl) interaction  .16 2.72  .49 1.03 
Severity*Dummy2(uf) interaction  -.21 -4.51  .11 -.43 
Suspect*Dummy1(ctrl) interaction  .09 .08  .60 .60 
Suspect*Dummy2(uf) interaction  3.49 2.71  1.26 1.14 
Suspect*Severity interaction  1.37 1.66  .39 .49 
Suspect*Dummy1(ctrl)*Severity interaction   -1.77   -.38 
Suspect*Dummy2(uf)*Severity interaction   2.29   .27 
Adjusted R2 -.02 -.03 -.04 -.02 -.01 -.02 
ΔR2 .01 .02 .01 .01 .05 .01 
F .24 .49 .51 .22 .89 .77 
Note: Table shows unstandardized regression coefficients. N = 160. 
*** p < .001.     
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Figure 1: Framework with negative emotion states as mediators of the relationship between 




























Figure 2: Framework with positive emotion states as mediators of the relationship between 




















































Figure 8 (ITS): Graph of Forgivenness-by-Severity interaction effect on offender’s shame 
 
    
 
